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9.1 Introduction
In the second half of the 1990s, several transition countries abandoned
ﬁxed exchange rate regimes and instead introduced inﬂation targeting as
framework for the conduct of monetary policy. In this paper, we will ana-
lyze the experience of three countries that moved to an inﬂation-targeting
regime: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.
It is worth studying inﬂation targeting in these transition countries for
two reasons. First, the transition countries are becoming an important part
of Europe, and designing the right monetary policy regime for their tran-
sition into successful European economies is valuable in its own right. Sec-
ond, these countries have three unique features that make the study of in-
ﬂation targeting in these countries particularly interesting: (a) they are new
democracies that are in the process of developing new governmental insti-
tutions; (b) their economies are undergoing radical restructuring as part
of the transition from socialism to capitalism; and (c) they are very likely
to enter the European Union (EU) and Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) in the near future. These three unique features are emphasized in
our discussion of their inﬂation-targeting regimes.
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and the NBER Inﬂation Targeting Conference for their helpful comments.tries moved to a more ﬂexible exchange rate regime and introduced inﬂa-
tion targeting. In the third section, we examine in more detail the intro-
duction of inﬂation targeting in the three countries, and in the fourth sec-
tion, we evaluate the preliminary experience with inﬂation targeting. In the
ﬁfth section, we discuss a number of speciﬁc issues for inﬂation targeting
in transition economies: what inﬂation measure to target, whether to tar-
get a point or a range, what should be the time horizon for the inﬂation tar-
get, who should set the inﬂation target, what should be the response to
faster-than-targeted disinﬂation, how monetary policy should respond to
deviations of inﬂation from the target, how much the ﬂoor of the inﬂation
target should be emphasized relative to the ceiling, and what role the ex-
change rate should play in an inﬂation-targeting regime. In the sixth sec-
tion, we discuss the future prospects of inﬂation targeting in transition
economies in connection with the planned adoption of the euro, focusing
on inﬂation targeting within the ﬂuctuation band of exchange rate mecha-
nism 2 (ERM2) regime and on the potential conﬂict between the inﬂation
target and the exchange rate target. The ﬁnal section contains concluding
remarks.
9.2 From Peg to Float
In economic history books, the 1990s will be probably remembered as a
decade when ﬁxed exchange rate regimes lost much of their attraction as
nominal anchors for the conduct of monetary policy. As a result of devas-
tating ﬁnancial crises, many emerging-market countries were forced to
abandon ﬁxed exchange rate regimes and replace them with more ﬂexible
exchange rate arrangements. Some countries—albeit a signiﬁcant minor-
ity—even opted to introduce more ﬂexible exchange rate regimes in an or-
derly way, without being forced to exit the peg as a result of ﬁnancial crisis
or market pressure on their currency.
This trend from more ﬁxed to more ﬂexible exchange rate regimes was
also observed in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe.
In the early years of transition, in the aftermath of price liberalization and
exchange rate devaluation, many transition economies have used the ex-
change rate peg as a nominal anchor to achieve a rapid stabilization of
price level. However, as with other emerging-market economies, transition
economies too have suﬀered the standard problem of exchange rate–based
stabilization programs: while inﬂation did decline signiﬁcantly, it did not
decline enough to prevent a large real appreciation that ultimately created
a balance-of-payment problem and forced the abandonment of the ﬁxed
exchange rate. While some countries opted for a hard version of a ﬁxed ex-
change rate—a currency board arrangement—others introduced man-
aged ﬂoat: ﬁrst the Czech Republic in 1997, then the Slovak Republic and
Poland in 1998. Hungary did not move to a fully ﬂoating currency regime,
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rency to move up and down within this band by 15 percent.
When abandoning the exchange rate pegs, the authorities of these coun-
tries had to decide what nominal anchor to use instead of the ﬁxed ex-
change rate. While the Slovak Republic did not accompany the move to a
ﬂoating exchange rate by an explicit introduction of new monetary policy
framework, the other three countries opted for inﬂation targeting. Why did
the authorities in these countries opt for inﬂation targeting, and why did
they reject alternative policy frameworks? We can learn why by examining
the problems of other monetary policy regimes.
One alternative would be to use monetary aggregates as an intermediate
target and nominal anchor. However, targeting monetary aggregates does
not have much attraction in transition economies.1The traditional problem
of instability of money demand, and therefore the unstable relationship be-
tween the growth of money supply and inﬂation, could be a particularly se-
rious obstacle to targeting monetary aggregates in transition economies.
Economic transition is characterized by a sequence of price shocks, includ-
ing corrections in administered prices and tax reforms, that make the rela-
tionship between money supply and price level very diﬃcult to predict. The
instability of money demand and money-price relationship is further exac-
erbated by far-reaching changes in the ﬁnancial sector, including deep in-
stitutional changes, the emergence of new types of ﬁnancial assets and play-
ers, and so on. Therefore, relying solely on targeting money supply growth
could be a quite ineﬀective approach to conducting monetary policy.
Transition economies could have also applied a discretionary, “just-do-
it” approach to monetary policy, as the Federal Reserve in the United
States is doing, in which there is no explicit nominal anchor.2 Given the
diﬃculty of establishing a more stable relationship between some interme-
diate target and price level, some may think that a less formal approach to
monetary policy would be advisable. However, while this approach may
work in countries whose central bank has well-established anti-inﬂationary
credibility, and where inﬂation is low, it is doubtful that it would work well
in transition economies. Particularly in the Czech Republic where inﬂation
was relatively high and rising after the ﬁxed exchange rate regime was
abandoned, the just-do-it approach to monetary policy was not seen as be-
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1. Indeed, it is not at all clear that monetary targeting is a viable strategy, even in industri-
alized countries, because the relationship between monetary aggregates and goal variables
such as inﬂation and nominal spending is typically quite weak. For example, see Estrella and
Mishkin (1997).
2. For a description of the just-do-it approach in the United States, see Bernanke et al.
(1999). Some transition economies are pursuing a managed ﬂoat (Romania, the Slovak Re-
public, Slovenia) or free ﬂoat (Albania) without a formal inﬂation-targeting framework in
place, although Albania is now introducing full-ﬂedged inﬂation targeting. It is interesting to
compare the development of inﬂation in these countries that have similarly ﬂexible exchange
rate regimes but no formal inﬂation-targeting regime in place (see section 9.4.3).ing potentially eﬀective in bringing inﬂation expectations and actual in-
ﬂation down. Without anti-inﬂation credibility, the just-do-it approach
would not suﬃciently anchor inﬂation expectations and persuade eco-
nomic agents that monetary policy would be actually conducted to control
inﬂation.
A third option would be to replace a ﬁxed exchange rate regime with a
harder variant of exchange rate peg—that is, by introducing a currency
board, or even unilaterally euroizing. This option has the advantage that it
provides a nominal anchor that helps keep inﬂation under control by tying
the prices of domestically produced tradable goods to those in the anchor
country, and making inﬂation expectations converge to those prevailing in
the anchor country. In addition, it provides an automatic adjustment mech-
anism that helps mitigate the time-inconsistency problem of monetary pol-
icy. Hard pegs also have the advantages of simplicity and clarity, which
make them easily understood by the public. However, the hard peg option
has the disadvantage that it leaves little scope for the country to conduct its
own monetary policy in order to react to domestic or foreign shocks.
For transition countries that wanted to retain some control over domes-
tic monetary policy and so opted to keep a ﬂexible exchange rate, the prob-
lems with monetary targeting and the just-do-it approach led them to
adopt a fourth option, inﬂation targeting. Inﬂation targeting has several
advantages over a hard peg, monetary targeting, and the just-do-it ap-
proach. In contrast to a hard peg, inﬂation targeting enables monetary pol-
icy to focus on domestic considerations and to respond to shocks of both
domestic and foreign origin. Inﬂation targeting also has the advantage that
stability in the relationship between money and inﬂation is not critical to
its success because it does not depend on such a relationship. Inﬂation tar-
geting, like a hard peg, also has the key advantage that it is easily under-
stood by the public and thus highly transparent. In contrast, monetary tar-
gets, although visible, are less likely to be well understood by the public,
especially as the relationship between monetary aggregates and inﬂation
becomes less stable and reliable. Because an explicit numerical target for
inﬂation increases the accountability of the central bank relative to a dis-
cretionary regime, inﬂation targeting also has the potential to reduce the
likelihood that the central bank will fall into the time-inconsistency trap.
Moreover, since the source of time inconsistency is often found in (covert
or open) political pressures on the central bank to engage in expansionary
monetary policy, inﬂation targeting has the advantage of focusing the po-
litical debate on what a central bank can do on a sustainable basis—that
is, control inﬂation—rather than on what it cannot do through monetary
policy—for example, raise output growth, lower unemployment, or in-
crease external competitiveness.
How well were the transition economies prepared for the introduction of
inﬂation targeting? In the literature, a relatively long list of requirements
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is to operate successfully.3 These requirements include (a) a strong ﬁscal
position, (b) a well-understood transmission mechanism between mone-
tary policy instruments and inﬂation, (c) a well-developed ﬁnancial sys-
tem, (d) central-bank independence and a clear mandate for price stability,
(e) a reasonably well-developed ability to forecast inﬂation, (f) absence of
other nominal anchors than inﬂation, and (g) transparent and accountable
monetary policy.
It is not possible to say whether a country meets these requirements or
not: it is more a question of the degree to which these preconditions are
met. On the whole, it could be argued that the three transition countries
that adopted inﬂation targeting, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland, met these requirements to a suﬃcient degree to make inﬂation tar-
geting feasible and useful.4
All three countries have an independent central bank with a clear man-
date to pursue price stability. In some cases, this independence and price
stability mandate has been strengthened just before the introduction of in-
ﬂation targeting. There has also been signiﬁcant progress in making mon-
etary policy decisions more transparent and central banks more account-
able, although this is still to some extent a work in progress in some
countries. Financial markets in the three analyzed economies are relatively
well developed, allowing for a reasonably eﬀective transmission mecha-
nism between monetary policy instruments and inﬂation.
With respect to ﬁscal position, partly as a result of explicit recognition
of hidden transformation-related costs, ﬁscal deﬁcits have widened signif-
icantly, particularly in the Czech Republic and Hungary (see table 9.1).
However, these deﬁcits have not yet posed a direct problem to inﬂation tar-
geting in the sense of ﬁscal dominance of monetary policy, because they
have been ﬁnanced by nonmonetary means at relatively favorable terms.5
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3. See Debelle (1997) and Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer (2000).
4. For a discussion of whether Hungary is ready for inﬂation targeting, see Siklos and Ábel
(2002).
5. Note that one can argue that a strong ﬁscal position is a requirement for successful con-
duct of monetary policy under any policy framework, not just inﬂation targeting. See Eichen-
green (1999) and Mishkin and Savastano (2001).
Table 9.1 Inﬂation-targeting countries: General government balance (in % of GDP,
excluding privatization revenues)
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001
Czech Republic –2.4 –2.0 –4.2 –5.2
Hungary –4.8 –3.4 –3.3 –4.7
Poland –3.2 –3.7 –3.2 –6.0
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2002).The main reason why large ﬁscal deﬁcits in accession countries do not trig-
ger adverse market reaction is that they are widely considered to be tem-
porary. In part this reﬂects the recognition of implicit public-sector liabili-
ties from the past. Moreover, as a result of EU/EMU accession, these
countries will adopt an institutional framework (the Stability and Growth
Pact, or SGP) that will require them to pursue disciplined ﬁscal policies.
Still, before the constraint of the SGP begins to operate, large ﬁscal deﬁcits
can complicate monetary policy conduct in indirect ways, as we will see in
our later discussion of these three countries’ experience with inﬂation tar-
geting.
As for the absence of multiple nominal anchors, this condition is clearly
met in the Czech Republic and Poland. These countries have in place a
regime of managed ﬂoating, and inﬂation is the only nominal anchor in the
economy. In Hungary, the situation is more complicated because of the
presence of the exchange rate band. Theoretically, this could be incompat-
ible with the requirement of the single nominal anchor if the band is too
narrow. We should note that the existence of the exchange rate ﬂuctuation
band is not only an issue of concern to Hungary today; it will be of concern
to all transition countries that join the ERM2 system, when they will have
to put in place the same ﬂuctuation band. We will discuss the issue of ﬂuc-
tuation band and inﬂation targeting in the section on monetary policy
within the ERM2 system.
Perhaps the most serious objection raised against the adoption of inﬂa-
tion targeting in transition economies is the limited ability to forecast in-
ﬂation accurately. This is partly the result of the relatively frequent occur-
rence of shocks to which transition economies are exposed, including price
deregulation and catching up with the more advanced economies, and also
the result of relatively large degree of openness of these economies. Actual
inﬂation is relatively unstable relative to the long-term inﬂation trend
(Orlowski 2000). Under such circumstances, there are natural limits to
central banks’ ability to forecast inﬂation that cannot be quickly and sub-
stantially improved by more sophisticated forecasting models. However,
inﬂation-targeting central banks are nevertheless making progress in im-
proving their inﬂation-forecasting capacity. One approach is to use alter-
native and less formal methods of gauging future inﬂation. For example, in
1999 the Czech National Bank introduced a survey of inﬂation forecasts by
market participants to measure inﬂation expectations.
9.3 Introduction of Inﬂation Targeting in Individual Countries
We will now turn in more detail to the introduction of inﬂation targeting
in individual countries. We will brieﬂy examine economic developments
preceding the introduction of inﬂation targeting, and the main operational
characteristics of the inﬂation-targeting regimes in the three countries.
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The Czech Republic was the ﬁrst transition economy to introduce an in-
ﬂation-targeting regime, which it did after abandoning the ﬁxed exchange
rate regime following currency turbulence in May 1997.6
A ﬁxed exchange rate regime played an important role in the macro-
economic stabilization package introduced in 1991. Several months after
liberalization of prices and devaluation of currency in 1991, the rate of in-
ﬂation came down quickly, although not quite to levels prevailing in
advanced economies. Inﬂation remained stuck at around 10 percent, and
wages and other nominal variables soon adjusted to this level. Higher do-
mestic inﬂation and the ﬁxed nominal exchange rate produced a real ap-
preciation, which was not fully validated by higher productivity growth,
and after some time, erosion of competitiveness became a concern. The
economy began to overheat, political constraints prevented a suﬃciently
vigorous and ﬂexible use of ﬁscal policy to mitigate imbalances in the non-
public sector, and tightening of monetary policy alone could not cope with
these rapidly growing imbalances. The mix of tighter monetary policy and
continued loose ﬁscal policy may have only made things worse: it con-
tributed to higher interest rates, which attracted more short-term foreign
capital, further fueling the growth of liquidity, keeping inﬂation high, and
widening the current account deﬁcit.
Ultimately, as the external deﬁcit continued to widen despite the visible
deceleration of economic growth later in 1996, the situation became un-
sustainable. It became increasingly obvious that the policy adjustment that
was feasible under the existing political constraints would fall short of
what was needed to reverse the unsustainable deterioration of current ac-
count position. Uncertainties in ﬁnancial markets, triggered initially by
speculative attacks on the Thai baht, only accelerated the ﬂight of foreign
investors from koruna assets, which forced the authorities to stop defend-
ing a ﬁxed exchange rate. On May 26, 1997, the government and the Czech
National Bank (CNB) decided to allow the koruna to ﬂoat freely.7
Like many other emerging-market countries, the Czech Republic did not
exit the peg at a time of strong external position, doing so only when it was
forced to do so by market pressure. However, unlike other central banks
that were ultimately forced to abandon the defense of a ﬁxed parity, the
CNB did not wait too long after the pressure on the koruna intensiﬁed.
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6. For an early analysis of inﬂation targeting in the Czech Republic see Hrnc ˇír ˇ and
S ˇmidková (1999) and Mahadeva and S ˇmidková (2000).
7. For a discussion of the Czech exchange rate crisis see Begg (1998). It is noteworthy that,
unlike the case of many other emerging-market countries that were forced to abandon the cur-
rency peg, the Czech koruna depreciated only moderately, and it subsequently strengthened
again. One reason for this limited depreciation was the relatively low degree of dollarization
and currency mismatches in the Czech economy and thus the limited eﬀect of the exit from
the peg on companies’ and banks’ balance sheets.Even though it ﬁrst tried to fend oﬀ the pressure by raising interest rates, it
did not waste a large amount of foreign reserves in foreign exchange mar-
ket intervention. In the week before the decision to ﬂoat, the CNB’s foreign
reserves declined by about $2.5 billion, to $10 billion. Given the unsatis-
factory experience with interventions as a tool to prevent the exit from a
pegged exchange rate regime, this was a correct decision.
Possible inﬂationary eﬀects of currency depreciation after the exit from
the peg, together with the absence of an alternative nominal anchor to
guide inﬂation expectations, created a risk that inﬂation would increase
signiﬁcantly in the coming months. Therefore, the CNB began to work on
a new monetary policy framework, and in the meantime it tried to guide
inﬂation expectations by its public pronouncements. After the koruna
(CZK) was allowed to ﬂoat, the CNB issued a public statement that it ex-
pected the average koruna exchange rate to stabilize within months at
roughly CZK 17 to 19.50 per 1 deutsche mark (DM) (Czech National Bank
1997). Furthermore, the CNB made it clear that in the future, monetary
policy would be unambiguously focused on domestic price-level stability
and reduction of potential inﬂationary eﬀects of the koruna’s exchange
rate movements (Czech National Bank 1997). The ﬁrst sentence may seem
to have been somewhat at odds with the managed ﬂoat. The reason for an-
nouncing a band in which the CNB expected the CZK/DM exchange rate
to settle was to prevent overshooting at a time when there was no other
nominal anchor to tie down exchange rate and inﬂation expectations, and
to limit to the extent possible any pass-through of currency depreciation to
domestic inﬂation.
However, the CNB felt that this approach to monetary policy conduct
was not satisfactory and could not continue for much longer. Therefore, on
December 21, the CNB Bank Board decided that in the future, monetary
programs would be formulated on basis of inﬂation targeting. The stated
purpose of inﬂation targeting was to provide a nominal anchor in the form
of an inﬂation target, to use monetary policy tools directly to achieve the
inﬂation target, and to regularly inform the public about the conduct of
monetary policy.8
In deciding what measure of inﬂation to target, the CNB faced a trade-
oﬀ between transparency and the ability to control inﬂation, an issue that
we will look at in detail later. The CNB opted for a compromise that it con-
sidered most appropriate for an economy in transition. For the purpose of
inﬂation targeting, it introduced a new concept, so-called net inﬂation. Net
inﬂation measures changes in the consumer price index (CPI), excluding
the movement in regulated prices, and is further adjusted for the impact on
360 Jiri Jonas and Frederic S. Mishkin
8. The path to inﬂation targeting for the CNB has many similarities to the path followed by
the Bank of England and the Riksbank after the collapse of their exchange rate pegs in 1992.
See Bernanke et al. (1999).the remaining items of changes in indirect taxes or subsidy elimination.9
Unlike many other inﬂation-targeting countries, the Czech Republic did
not exclude from net inﬂation changes in the prices of energy and agricul-
tural products. Such an exclusion would have narrowed the targeted price
index too much and would have made it too detached from the headline in-
ﬂation. Instead, the CNB subsequently introduced so-called exceptions to
deal with this problem (see below).
In choosing whether to target a range or a single numerical value of in-
ﬂation, the CNB opted for a range. Initially, in 1998 and 1999, it was tar-
geting a band 1 percentage point wide, but from 2000, it widened the band
to 2 percentage points. The CNB’s decision about the width of the band
was guided mainly by its assessment of the accuracy with which it thought
it could hit net inﬂation targets, as well as the past volatility of net inﬂation.
At the end of 1998, the CNB made some modiﬁcations to its inﬂation-
targeting strategy. First, the CNB introduced the “exceptions” that could
justify missing an inﬂation target. Exceptions refer to exceptional and un-
predictable factors that cause actual inﬂation to deviate from the inﬂation
target and for which the CNB cannot bear responsibility. These factors in-
clude the following: signiﬁcant diﬀerences between actual and predicted
world prices of commodities; signiﬁcant diﬀerences between actual and
predicted exchange rate that do not reﬂect developments of domestic eco-
nomic fundamentals and monetary policy; signiﬁcant changes of condi-
tions in agriculture that aﬀect agriculture producer prices; and natural dis-
asters and other extraordinary events that produce demand-led and
cost-pushed price shocks (Czech National Bank 1999, 57).
Second, the CNB decided to take a more active role in aﬀecting inﬂation
expectations. It realized that a much more rapid than originally expected
decline in inﬂation in the second half of 1998, together with large degree of
rigidity in nominal variables, could produce undesirable developments in
real variables—most importantly, real wages. The CNB therefore initiated
an informative meeting with the representatives of trade unions and em-
ployees in order to explain what inﬂation it expected in 1999 and, in this
way, to help reduce inﬂation expectations.10
In December 1999, the CNB approved Long-Term Monetary Strategy,
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9. At the end of 1997, the CPI consisted of 754 items, 91 items had regulated price, and net
inﬂation measured the movements of 663 items, which in terms of weights in the consumer
basket represented about four-ﬁfths of the total basket.
10. Trade unions agreed that it would not be desirable to aim for higher than zero growth
in real wages in 1999. The catch was that trade unions’ economic experts projected that inﬂa-
tion in 1999 would reach 10 percent, and trade unions therefore demanded a 10 percent in-
crease in nominal wages, which in their view would be consistent with zero growth in real
wages. As inﬂation in 1999 remained close to 2 percent, 10 percent nominal wage growth re-
sulted in a large increase in real wages. At the end of 1999, when the CNB was again discussing
with the representatives of trade unions inﬂation prospects for 2000, they seemed to have
learned from their mistake and expressed more trust in CNB’s inﬂation forecast for 2000.which speciﬁed the long-term inﬂation target for 2005. The objective was
to make the inﬂation-targeting strategy more forward looking. Impor-
tantly, the CNB made an eﬀort to involve the public and the government in
discussion of the long-term monetary policy target. No doubt this out-
reach eﬀort reﬂected the criticism by some politicians that the process of
disinﬂation was too fast and too costly in 1998 and 1999. The CNB did not
wish to announce the quantiﬁed long-term target corresponding to price
stability and the speed with which this ultimate objective was to be
achieved without acquiring the support of the government. The CNB
seems to have acknowledged implicitly that the decision on the speed of
disinﬂation is ultimately a political one and that it had to be taken by a
body with political mandate.
Another modiﬁcation of the inﬂation-targeting framework took place
in April 2001. At that time, the CNB decided that the main reasons for fa-
voring net inﬂation targeting rather than headline inﬂation targeting had
disappeared, and it decided that from 2002 on, it would target headline in-
ﬂation measured by the CPI.11 The CNB explained that headline inﬂation
covers more comprehensively price developments in the economy and that
it is more relevant for decisions of economic agents. For these reasons, by
targeting headline inﬂation, monetary policy should also be better able to
aﬀect inﬂation expectations. Headline inﬂation targets for the period
2002–2005 were derived from the trajectory of net inﬂation speciﬁed in the
December 1999 Long-Term Monetary Strategy.The CNB realized that tar-
geting headline inﬂation has its risks as well, the most important one being
the uncertainty regarding the development of regulated prices and eﬀects
of changes in administered prices. For example, the need to achieve a
stronger adjustment of ﬁscal imbalances could require a larger-than-
expected increase in administered prices, with consequently larger impact
on headline inﬂation. Another complication could arise from the harmo-
nization of indirect taxes with the EU ahead of the EU entry. But these un-
expected eﬀects of changes in regulated prices or administrative measures
on headline inﬂation were included in the exceptions that allowed actual
inﬂation to deviate from the inﬂation target without necessitating a mone-
tary policy response. After the April 2001 modiﬁcation, the list of the ex-
ceptions included the following:
• Major deviations in world prices of raw materials, energy-producing
materials, and other commodities
• Major deviations of the koruna’s exchange rate that are not connected
with domestic economic fundamentals and domestic monetary policy
• Major changes in the conditions for agricultural production having an
impact on agriculture producer prices
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11. However, already in 2000, when it announced the net inﬂation target for end-2001, the
CNB also began publishing its projection of headline inﬂation.• Natural disasters and other extraordinary events having cost and de-
mand impacts on prices
• Changes in regulated prices whose eﬀects on headline inﬂation would
exceed 1–1.5 percentage points
• Step changes in indirect taxes
The CNB has also announced that the list of exceptions could be further
widened in the future to include one-time price shocks resulting from the
adoption of EU standards.
9.3.2 Poland
After the Czech Republic, Poland was the second transition country to
introduce inﬂation targeting. Its approach to inﬂation targeting diﬀers in
some important aspects from that of the Czech Republic.
As a part of Poland’s big-bang approach to macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion, the zloty was pegged to a basket of currencies in 1990. But inﬂation
did not decline suﬃciently rapidly, and ﬁxed nominal exchange rate re-
sulted in rapid real appreciation and erosion of competitiveness. There-
fore, a preannounced crawling peg was introduced in October 1991. Capi-
tal account liberalization led in 1994 and 1995 to large capital inﬂows,
which forced the authorities to widen the crawling exchange rate band in
May 1995 to  7 percent. Upward pressure on the currency continued, and
in December 1995 the central rate was revalued by 6.4 percent in order to
be aligned with the prevailing market rate. In early 1998, the National
Bank of Poland (NBP) began to widen the band again: to ±10 percent in
February 1998, to ±12.5 percent in October 1998, and ﬁnally to ±15 per-
cent in March 1999. At the same time, the rate of crawl was reduced from
an initial 1.8 percent per month in 1991 to 0.3 percent per month. The
main reason for the gradual widening of the band was the eﬀort of the NBP
to be better able to accommodate large capital inﬂows.
Poland’s transition to an inﬂation-targeting regime began during 1998.
As in Hungary, the introduction of inﬂation targeting was preceded by the
amendment of the Act on the NBP. This Act speciﬁed that the primary ob-
jective of the NBP is to maintain a stable price level and simultaneously
support economic policy of the government, provided that this does not
constrain the execution of the primary target. The Act also established the
Monetary Policy Council (MPC) of the NBP, which replaced the NBP
Management Board as the decision-making body. In April 1998, the MPC
updated the Assumptions of Monetary Policy for 1998, prepared originally
by NBP Management Board in September 1997, and conﬁrmed that the
1998 NBP inﬂation target of 9.5 percent remained unchanged.12 In June
1998, the MPC deﬁned target for monetary policy in 1999, which was to re-
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12. This should be interpreted more as a forecast than as a full-ﬂedged inﬂation target.duce inﬂation to 8–8.5 percent and began to work on Assumptions of Mon-
etary Policy for 1999,as well as on Medium-Term Monetary Policy Strategy
for 1999–2003.These documents were approved in September 1998, and at
the same time the NBP oﬃcially announced the introduction of inﬂation
targeting. The NBP also announced at that time the medium-term inﬂation
target for 2003: reduction of inﬂation to less than 4 percent. The NBP also
indicated that from that time on, annual inﬂation targets would be an-
nounced in Assumptions of Monetary Policy.
It should be noted that at the time of announcement to implement inﬂa-
tion targeting, Poland still maintained an exchange rate band, which at the
time of announcement was widened from  10 percent to  12.5 percent,
and later to  15 percent. Only in April 2000 did Poland abandon the ex-
change rate band and switch to a managed ﬂoat.
Poland has decided to target the broad CPI. The NBP explained that the
CPI has been used extensively in Poland since the beginning of transition,
and that it is deeply rooted in public perceptions as the measure of inﬂa-
tion. The CPI provides accurate information about changes in price levels
of consumer goods and services. Application of some measure of core in-
ﬂation would require eliminating from the targeted index some prices of
goods and services that strongly aﬀect public perception of inﬂation de-
velopments. However, the NBP has started preparatory work for calculat-
ing the core inﬂation index, and it did not exclude the possibility that it
would start targeting core inﬂation in the future.13
Like the Czech Republic, Poland has chosen to target a band rather than
a point. Initially, it chose a quite narrow target range, just one-half of a per-
centage point, which was subsequently widened to 1.2 points. The NBP ex-
plains that before the introduction of inﬂation targeting, monetary targets
in Poland were deﬁned as ﬁxed points, and a wider band could possibly sig-
nal to the public a weaker commitment to reducing inﬂation. It could be ar-
gued that under such circumstances a ﬁxed point could be better than a nar-
row band, as both are unlikely to be hit, and the damage of missing a point
could be less serious than the damage of missing a band. However, the NBP
did not exclude the possibility that it may widen the band in the future.
Unlike the Czech National Bank, the NBP did not explicitly deﬁne ex-
ceptions that would allow missing the inﬂation target without requiring the
monetary policy response. However, the NBP subsequently analyzed in
depth the process of inﬂation in Poland and the role of monetary and non-
monetary factors (National Bank of Poland 2001, appendix 2). Speciﬁ-
cally, the NBP calculates and analyzes diﬀerent measures of the core inﬂa-
tion. It explains that even though core inﬂation rates do not replace the
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13. See National Bank of Poland (1998). It is noteworthy that the NBP intends to calculate
the core inﬂation itself. Usually, central banks targeting a measure of underlying inﬂation do
not calculate this index. In order to avoid a conﬂict of interest, they let other agencies, mainly
statistical oﬃces, calculate and publish underlying inﬂation.headline consumer price index, they provide input for research and anal-
ysis and for decisions on monetary policy.
9.3.3 Hungary
The introduction of inﬂation targeting in the Czech Republic could be
characterized as a “big bang” approach. There was a clear break with the
past ﬁxed exchange rate regime, and after a few months of technical prepa-
ration, a full-ﬂedged inﬂation-targeting regime was put in place. In con-
trast, Hungary’s introduction of inﬂation targeting could be characterized
as “gradualist,” even more so than for Poland.14
Like other transition economies, Hungary adopted early in its transition
an exchange rate peg of the forint against the basket of currencies. How-
ever, the peg was adjusted downward quite often to maintain external com-
petitiveness. The ﬂuctuation band was gradually widened from  0.5 per-
cent to  2.25 percent, to reduce speculative pressures ahead of the
predictable adjustments of the parity. But this mechanism did not prevent
large short-term capital inﬂows in late 1994, and in March 1995, after a de-
valuation of 8.3 percent, the regime of ad hoc adjustment was replaced
with a crawling band. The monthly rate of crawl was initially set at 1.9 per-
cent but was gradually reduced to 0.4 percent after October 1999. This
regime succeeded in bringing inﬂation down from about 30 percent in 1995
to below 10 percent in 1999.
Even at the time when the Czech Republic and Poland were abandoning
ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, the Hungarian authorities continued to view
this narrow ﬂuctuation band as a useful nominal anchor. The band helped
reduce inﬂation and anchor inﬂation expectations, while at the same time
avoiding excessive real appreciation and erosion of competitiveness. How-
ever, like other emerging-market countries with a ﬁxed exchange rate, Hun-
gary too was ultimately forced to deal with the problems caused by large
capital inﬂows. For some time, Hungary was able to avoid pressure on the
narrow exchange rate band because of the presence of controls on short-
term capital ﬂows. These controls were eﬀective in introducing a wedge be-
tween onshore and oﬀshore interest rates, providing some degree of inde-
pendence to monetary policy. But it was clear that as capital controls were
relaxed in line with progression to EU accession a narrow-band regime
would become more diﬃcult to sustain.
The problems with the narrow exchange rate band began to intensify in
the course of 2000. Inﬂation, which declined signiﬁcantly in the period
1995–99, began to creep up again. While this increase in inﬂation was ini-
tially triggered by external shocks, like higher world oil prices, domestic fac-
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14. Perhaps this is just another example of the gradualist approach of Hungary to economic
reforms more generally, unlike the “big bang” or “shock therapy” approach applied in the
Czech Republic and Poland.tors began to play a role as well, including the exchange rate regime. The
constraints of the narrow band and increasing capital inﬂows in 2000 began
to make it more diﬃcult for the central bank to simultaneously pursue dis-
inﬂation and nominal exchange rate stability. Early in 2000, the central
bank acted to reduce the pressure on the exchange rate band by cutting in-
terest rates, and it also threatened to introduce capital controls. This strat-
egy worked, and the exchange rate depreciated. However, in a situation of
strong economic growth, robust domestic demand, and tight labor markets,
reducing interest rates did not help much in ﬁghting inﬂation, which re-
mained relatively high. Periodically, speculative pressures for appreciation
and widening of the band appeared, forcing the central bank to cut interest
rates and/or intervene in foreign exchange market. It opted to do mainly the
latter, and it sterilized the liquidity created as a result of these interventions.
However, as the sterilization costs were increasing, it was becoming clear
that the narrow exchange rate band had outlived its usefulness and that
Hungary needed to introduce more exchange rate ﬂexibility if it was to suc-
ceed in reducing inﬂation further.15In May 2001, the authorities ﬁnally de-
cided to widen the ﬂuctuation band around the forint parity against the
euro to  15 percent.16 The crawling regime was maintained, with the rate
of crawl reduced to 0.2 percent monthly, and remaining controls on short-
term capital ﬂows were phased out. In October 2001, the crawling peg was
completely abolished.
While a wider exchange rate band should allow the government to attach
more priority to ﬁghting inﬂation, as we will discuss below, a conﬂict be-
tween the inﬂation target and exchange rate target could still arise and
complicate the conduct of monetary policy. However, the change in the
monetary policy regime has been somewhat confused. At the time when
the authorities decided to widen the ﬂuctuation band, they did not imme-
diately announce a shift to a new monetary policy regime. Even though the
new exchange rate band was too wide to serve as a useful nominal anchor,
the authorities were moving to inﬂation targeting only gradually. But on
July 13, 2001, the new Act on the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) was
enacted by Parliament, which deﬁned the achievement and maintenance of
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15. In 2000, inﬂation ended at 10.1 percent (December to December), much more than the
government had projected earlier. In 1999, the government projected that average annual in-
ﬂation would be 6–7 percent in year 2000. In early 2001, inﬂation increased further, close to
11 percent. Hungary’s ambition to join the EU and adopt the euro as soon as possible had
probably contributed to the increasing emphasis on further progress with disinﬂation that
could be accomplished only with a higher degree of nominal exchange rate ﬂexibility, and on
the willingness to accept the consequences of a stronger currency for the competitiveness and
external balance.
16. Israel also adopted an inﬂation-targeting regime with a narrow exchange rate band in
1991. Like Hungary, it also found it necessary to widen the exchange rate band, doing so in
1995. Over time, the Israelis have further downplayed the exchange rate in their inﬂation-
targeting regime. For a discussion of Israeli inﬂation targeting and the role of the exchange
rate, see Leiderman and Bufman (2000) and Bernanke et al. (1999).price stability as the prime objective of the NBH. The Act also sought to
reinforce NBH independence, in accordance with the EU requirement.
In its August 2001 Quarterly Inﬂation report, the NBH explained that
for the next couple of years it would be using the inﬂation-targeting system
to achieve a gradual reduction of inﬂation to a level corresponding to price
stability (National Bank of Hungary 2001, 35–36). The NBH objective is
to meet the Maastricht criterion on inﬂation in 2004–2005, so that it can
adopt the euro in 2006–2007. Speciﬁcally, the NBH states that it will seek
to bring inﬂation down to around 2 percent. In agreement with the govern-
ment, the NBH set an inﬂation target of 7 percent for December 2001, 4.5
percent for 2002, and 3.5 percent for 2003 and 2004. In recognition of the
fact that the NBH cannot instantly oﬀset unexpected inﬂationary shocks,it
has also established a  1 percent tolerance band around the announced
disinﬂation path.
The primary instrument that the NBH uses to attain its inﬂation targets
is changes in its benchmark interest rates. The NBH has particularly em-
phasized the important role of changes in exchange rate on inﬂation. It ar-
gues that in Hungary, the exchange rate channel is the central bank’s fastest
and most powerful means of inﬂuencing domestic prices. (However, we
will see later in section 9.5 that this reasoning may be dangerous.) While the
exchange rate will not have the same prominent role as during the narrow-
band regime, and the NBH will be less able to control its short-term move-
ments, it will continue to play an important role. The NBH has indicated
that it will try to inﬂuence the exchange rate in order to achieve the desired
inﬂation outcome. In order to achieve the changes in exchange rate, it will
use mainly changes in interest rates, while direct intervention in the foreign
exchange market will be used only exceptionally, to deal with emergency
situations. The NBH recognizes that in the short term, the actual exchange
rate could deviate from an exchange rate path that would be consistent with
the disinﬂation path. All in all, exchange rate movements seem to play a
much more important role in Hungary than in other inﬂation-targeting
countries. Such explicit emphasis on the role of exchange rate movements
in achieving inﬂation targets as seen in Hungary is quite unique.
The NBH estimates that it takes up to one and a half years for changes
in interest rates to have a full impact on inﬂation. It argues that if it tried to
keep inﬂation in line with the targeted path over the short-term horizon,
the result could be excessive volatility of output (and arguably also exces-
sive instrument volatility). Therefore, it will conﬁne policy responses only
to deviation of forecasted inﬂation from targeted inﬂation over the horizon
of one to one and a half years.
The transparency of this new system should be enhanced by the publi-
cation of NBH’s inﬂation projections every quarter for the following six
quarters. Moreover, the NBH will also publish the considerations that were
behind its monetary policy decisions, and its analysis of the achievement
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jection of inﬂation using a fan chart.
Unlike the CNB, the NBH began to target headline inﬂation immedi-
ately. But there is no discussion in NBH oﬃcial documents about the rea-
sons for choosing to target headline inﬂation rather than adjusted or under-
lying inﬂation. The NBH also did not specify any exceptions that would
justify a deviation of actual inﬂation from its inﬂation target, although there
is some discussion in its inﬂation reports about the possible extent of price
deregulation and its eﬀects on headline inﬂation. When announcing the in-
troduction of inﬂation targeting, the NBH was also silent about the possible
conﬂict between the exchange rate band and the inﬂation target.
Overall, the impression is that the NBH has focused less on operational
aspects of the inﬂation-targeting regime than has the CNB or even the
NBP. Perhaps this reﬂects the fact that NBH oﬃcials still attach impor-
tance to the nominal exchange rate band as an important anchor of the
economy. They seem to believe that moving the exchange rate within the
band will help them to achieve a long-term inﬂation target that will allow
them to qualify for euro adoption. In a sense, this strategy could be under-
stood: why invest heavily in a detailed design for a policy framework that
will be removed in a few years anyway after Hungary adopts the euro? The
Czech Republic and Poland introduced inﬂation targeting much earlier,
and they may also be less eager to adopt the euro as soon as possible. This
means that inﬂation targeting could be in place for a longer time and that
a well-designed inﬂation-targeting framework may be more necessary.
9.4 Preliminary Experience with Inﬂation Targeting
In view of the relatively short period during which inﬂation targeting has
been implemented in the transition economies, it is too early to make a de-
ﬁnitive judgment about the experience of the operation of this new policy
framework. Nevertheless, some preliminary observations can be made.
There are two ways in which we can evaluate the experience with inﬂation
targeting in transition economies.
First, we can look at how successful inﬂation-targeting central banks were
in achieving inﬂation rates close to their inﬂation targets. Here the answer is
“not all that successful.” Initially, the CNB signiﬁcantly undershot its inﬂa-
tion target several times, while the NBP ﬁrst overshot it and subsequently
undershot it. The NBH hit its targets in 2001 and 2002, but its short experi-
ence with inﬂation targeting does not tell us much yet. But even this short-
term experience makes one thing clear: namely, the problems of simulta-
neously targeting inﬂation and exchange rate in a world of free capital ﬂows.
Second, we can examine the success of inﬂation targeting in reducing in-
ﬂation. Looking only at these countries’ success in hitting their inﬂation
targets could be too narrow a perspective for assessing the performance of
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economies have emphasized that the main purpose of the inﬂation-
targeting framework is to allow these countries to bring inﬂation down to
a level that would qualify them for euro adoption. When we evaluate inﬂa-
tion targeting from this perspective, the preliminary experience with this
regime should be judged more positively: all three countries are proceed-
ing well with disinﬂation, and there is a good chance that in a few years
they will be able to reach price stability, as deﬁned for the purpose of euro
adoption. However, the process of disinﬂation is not a smooth one, and
there are quite large variations in inﬂation.
Let us now look in more detail at the record of implementation of in-
ﬂation targeting in the three analyzed countries. First we will discuss the
speed of disinﬂation implied by announced inﬂation targets, and then we
will examine how successful the inﬂation-targeting countries were in hit-
ting these targets.
9.4.1 Inﬂation Targets and the Speed of Disinﬂation
In many advanced economies that pursue inﬂation targeting, this regime
has been introduced only after price stability has been reached (Bernanke et
al. 1999). But this was not the case in the transition economies, where, at the
time of introduction of inﬂation targeting, inﬂation was still running well
above the level considered consistent with price stability. Therefore, the au-
thorities in these countries had to make two decisions: (a) to quantify an in-
ﬂation target that would be compatible with the long-term objective of price
stability, and (b) to decide on the time horizon within which this ultimate
objective was to be met—that is, to decide on the speed of disinﬂation.
There is extensive literature discussing how to quantify price stability. In
the literature, we can ﬁnd several arguments why central banks should not
quantify price stability as inﬂation at zero or near zero (in the range of 0–1
percent). One reason relates to downward nominal wage rigidity. If the in-
ﬂation rate were to approach zero under the condition of downward wage
rigidity, it would be diﬃcult to achieve real wage adjustment in response to
changed market conditions, such as a negative demand shock. The result
could be higher-than-desirable real wages, higher unemployment, and
lower economic growth.17 A second reason relates to the impossibility of
reducing nominal interest rates below zero, which means that if inﬂation is
close to zero, real interest rates cannot be pushed below zero when this
might be necessary in order to stimulate economic activity.18Furthermore,
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17. This mechanism is described in Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996), but it is highly con-
troversial because the evidence that low inﬂation leads to a rise in unemployment is very
mixed. In addition, as pointed out in Groshen and Schweitzer (1996, 1999), inﬂation can not
only put “grease” in the labor markets as Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry argue, but also put in
“sand” that makes the labor markets less eﬃcient.
18. This argument has been made in Summers (1991).a zero inﬂation target may lead to periods of deﬂation, which could pro-
mote ﬁnancial instability and make it harder to conduct monetary policy
because interest rates would no longer provide a useful guide to the stance
of monetary policy (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 2002).
In the literature, one can observe a convergence of views that an inﬂation
rate of 1–3 percent corresponds to price stability (see table 9.2). If we look
at how central banks quantify price stability in practice, we see that there
is not much diﬀerence between the theoretical conclusions and what the
central banks actually do. This is the case for all economies—developed,
developing, and transition.
However, some have raised the question of whether the speciﬁc condi-
tions of transition economies would not justify targeting somewhat higher
inﬂation than in developed economies. High-growth countries typically ex-
perience real exchange rate appreciation by an amount proportional to the
relative diﬀerence of traded to nontraded sector productivity growth rela-
tive to the rest of the world (the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect). If it is
appropriate for these countries to aim at traded goods inﬂation similar to
that of industrialized countries in the long run, then trend real apprecia-
tion requires a domestic nontraded goods inﬂation that is somewhat
higher, and so the inﬂation rate should be slightly higher than would be de-
sirable for average-growth countries. S ˇkreb (1998) notes that in the transi-
tion economies it is particularly diﬃcult to measure precisely the improve-
ments in the quality of goods. As a result, actual inﬂation could be much
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Table 9.2 Inﬂation targets
Country Targeted inﬂation (%) Period
Czech Republic 1–3 (2–4)a 2005
Australia 2–3 Average during a business cycle
Brazilb 2–6 2001
Chile 2–4 2001




New Zealand 0–3 From 1996
Canada 1–3 From 1995
Euro area   2F r om 1999
United Kingdom 2.5 From 1996
Source: Schaechder, Stone, and Zelmer (2000); web sites of Banco de México (http://www
.banxico.org.mx/), National Bank of Hungary (http://www.mnb.hu/), and European Central
Bank (http://www.ecb.int/).
a1–3 percent is for net inﬂation, 2–4 percent for headline inﬂation.
bFor 2002, the target was subsequently set at 2.5–4.5 percent, but as a result of the debt crisis
and sharp currency depreciation, inﬂation in 2002 reached 12.5 percent. In response to higher
inﬂation, the central bank also raised its 2003 and 2004 targets.lower than measured inﬂation. Because of these measurement problems, as
well as other reasons, S ˇkreb argues that in transition economies inﬂation
in the range of 4–5 percent would correspond to price stability.
Other authors argue, however, that during the convergence with the de-
veloped economies, transition economies should be expected to experience
a rapid growth of labor productivity from implementation of economic re-
forms, which should produce lower inﬂation (Deppler 1998). Clinton (2000)
argues that rapid productivity growth in transition economies weakens the
traditional arguments in favor of a notably higher-than-zero inﬂation rate.
Given the rapid growth of labor productivity, a decline in nominal wages
would rarely be needed.19Similarly, given the high real return on capital and
high trend toward economic growth, it is not very likely that a situation
would arise in which a central bank would have to stimulate an economy in
recession with the help of negative real interest rates.
What can be said about the speed of disinﬂation? Theoretically, disinﬂa-
tion could be too quick, resulting in excessively large (although arguably
temporary) loss of output and higher unemployment, or it could be too
slow; inﬂation expectations could become more entrenched at a high level,
and this would make it more costly to reduce inﬂation later.20 Therefore, it
could be argued that there exists an optimal speed of disinﬂation that
would minimize the sacriﬁce ratio (the ratio of loss of output to disinﬂa-
tion).21 However, the determination of this optimal speed of disinﬂation is
less a matter of exact science and more a matter of judgment.
In the literature, a number of factors have been identiﬁed that aﬀect the
sacriﬁce ratio—that is, the output eﬀect of disinﬂation. These include the
structure of the economy, the degree and the means of indexation of wages
and other nominal variables, past history of inﬂation and stabilization,
credibility of monetary policy, the degree of openness of the economy, and
so on. Furthermore, as has been shown in the case of other countries,
change in inﬂation is positively correlated with the level of economic activ-
ity (Stock and Watson 1999). Given the fact that economic reasoning does
not provide a hard conclusion about the optimal speed of disinﬂation, and
in view of the important consequences of the decision about the speed of
disinﬂation for the economy and for diﬀerent population groups, societies
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19. One problem with this argument is that the rapid productivity growth applies econo-
mywide, but there could still be ﬁrms or industries where productivity growth would be small
or negative and where decline in nominal wages would be called for if inﬂation was close to
zero.
20. It could be argued that lower inﬂation usually means higher output growth, and there-
fore the sooner lower inﬂation is reached, the sooner will the economy achieve a higher out-
put growth. But there are also counterarguments. For example, due to a loss of marketable
skills, persons that could be seen as temporarily unemployed during the period of rapid dis-
inﬂation could become permanently unemployed, which results in an additional loss of out-
put.
21. For a discussion of the costs of disinﬂation see Ball (1994). The author comes to the con-
clusion that fast disinﬂation reduces the sacriﬁce ratio.pay particular attention to the mechanism through which this decision is
reached. By its nature, the decision about the speed of disinﬂation is not a
purely technocratic decision that could be put solely in the hands of pro-
fessional economists or central bankers. Because diﬀerent speeds of disin-
ﬂation will have diﬀerent consequences for diﬀerent population groups,
this decision is by nature a political one, and thus an argument can be made
for entrusting it to a political body that has the political legitimacy to make
such political choices. This has implications for the debate on the optimal
degree of central bank independence that is discussed in section 9.5.
However, for transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the
desire to adopt the euro at some point in the future is of more practical rel-
evance for monetary policy than the theoretical arguments about the ap-
propriate quantiﬁcation of price stability and the optimal speed of disin-
ﬂation. Eventual euro adoption will depend on the ability to meet the
Maastricht criteria, including low inﬂation, and the decision to adopt the
euro at a certain date will thus implicitly contain a decision on how quickly
and how far disinﬂation will have to go.
All three countries that we examine will have to adopt the euro at some
point after entering the EU, even though they may choose a diﬀerent speed
with which to do so. But notwithstanding this possible diﬀerent speed, all
three countries are committed to a relatively fast disinﬂation. Table 9.3
summarizes the speed of disinﬂation implied by the level of inﬂation at the
time of the introduction of inﬂation targets and by the long-term inﬂation
objective.
As we can see, the ultimate objective is deﬁned in each country in a diﬀer-
ent way: as a range in the Czech Republic (both upper and lower band are
speciﬁed); as a maximum ceiling in Poland (only an upper band is speciﬁed),
and as a “soft” point target in Hungary (no lower and upper bound are spec-
iﬁed, but inﬂation should meet the Maastricht criterion). This also means
that one single inﬂation rate could meet all these constraints at the same time.
Even though the Czech Republic did not reveal a ﬁrm intention to choose
the fastest possible strategy to adopt the euro, the CNB still opted for a rel-
atively quick disinﬂation so that it would be able to meet the Maastricht cri-
terion and eventually move quickly to adopt the euro if it chooses to. Figure
9.1 shows the CNB’s actual and targeted inﬂation. When the inﬂation-
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Table 9.3 The speed of disinﬂation
End-1997 Introduction of Inﬂation at Direction Ultimate Year to be
Country inﬂation inﬂation targeting that time of inﬂation objective achieved
Czech Republic 10.0 December 97 10.0 Rising 2–4 2005
Hungary 18.4 August 01 8.7 Falling Around 2 2004–5
Poland 13.2 June 98 12.2 Falling   4 2003









































































































.targeting framework was adopted in December 1997, inﬂation was 10 per-
cent, and it continued to rise, to about 13 percent in early 1998 (in CPI
terms; net inﬂation approached 8 percent). The CNB decided that at the end
of 1998 net inﬂation should decline to 5.5–6.5 percent and, at the end of
year 2000, to 3.5–5.5 percent. In December 1999, the CNB quantiﬁed its
long-term objective of price stability: net inﬂation in the range of 1–3 per-
cent in 2005, which was subsequently complemented by setting the 2005
CPI target in the range of 2–4 percent. Given the inﬂation target for the year
2000 in the range of 3.5–5.5 percent, this implied an average annual reduc-
tion in net inﬂation by 0.5 percentage points. The CNB explained that this
long-term target would basically imply a continuation of the existing pace
of disinﬂation. However, in December 2002, CPI inﬂation fell to 0.6 per-
cent, which already brought it well below the long-term target range.
In Poland, the NBP ﬁrst set a short-term inﬂation target in June 1998 for
end-1999 in the range of 8–8.5 percent (see ﬁgure 9.2). At the time of the
announcement of the inﬂation target, inﬂation was above 12 percent and
declining. In September 1999, the NBP also announced the medium-term
target of CPI inﬂation of less than 4 percent at the end of 2003. Subse-
quently, inﬂation continued to fall faster that expected, and in March 1999,
when it fell to around 6 percent, the NBP modiﬁed the end-1999 CPI tar-
get to 6.6–7.8 percent. In September 1999, in Monetary Guidelines for the
Year 2000, the NBP set end-2000 inﬂation target in the range of 5.4–6.8
percent. However, the process of disinﬂation in Poland was interrupted, as
inﬂation increased from 5.6 percent in February 1999 to 11.6 percent in
July 2000. Therefore, the 2001 inﬂation target was set higher than in 2000,
6–8 percent, but the targeted inﬂation range for end-2002 was reduced to
4–6 percent. As inﬂation at the end of 2001 fell to 3.6 percent, meeting this
target would have required another mild pickup in inﬂation. Instead, in-
ﬂation in 2002 fell rapidly and in December 2002 reached 0.8 percent, re-
sulting in another signiﬁcant undershooting of the target. During 2003, in-
ﬂation in Poland remained below the NBP long-term objective.
Hungary launched oﬃcial inﬂation targeting only in mid-2001.22At that
time, inﬂation was already declining: from a peak of 10.8 percent in May
2001, it fell to 8.7 percent in August when details of the new inﬂation-
targeting regime were published in the Quarterly Inﬂation Report (see ﬁg-
ure 9.3). For 2001, the inﬂation target was set in the range of 6–8 percent.
For 2002, the inﬂation target was set at 3.5–5.5 percent, and for 2003 the
target was set at 2.5–4.5 percent.23 The NBH’s long-term objective is that
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22. The NBH was publishing inﬂation objectives based on government budgetary projec-
tions for 1998, 1999, and 2000 (12–13 percent, 9 percent, and 6–7 percent respectively), but
these were not formal inﬂation targets and there was no formal requirement for the NBH to
meet them (see Siklos and Ábel 2002).
23. The long-term inﬂation target and the 2002 target were announced in the August 2001
Inﬂation Report, while the 2003 target was announced in the press on December 2001, when





















































































































































































































































































































































































.Hungary meet the Maastricht criterion on inﬂation in 2004–2005, which
should be possible with inﬂation even slightly higher than the 2 percent
that the NBH seeks to achieve in the long term. Unlike the Czech Repub-
lic and Poland, Hungary also speciﬁed its long-term inﬂation target quali-
tatively, in terms of meeting the Maastricht criterion for inﬂation, thus un-
derscoring its preference to adopt the euro sooner rather than later. As
inﬂation in late 2003 approached 6 percent, meeting the long-term inﬂa-
tion target would require bringing inﬂation below present level, in contrast
to the Czech Republic and Poland, where inﬂation is likely to pick up some-
what from present unsustainable low levels.
9.4.2 Hitting and Missing Inﬂation Targets
In the previous section, we examined experience with inﬂation targeting
from the perspective of disinﬂation. In this section, we look at how suc-
cessful the three countries were in meeting their inﬂation targets. In this re-
spect, we should keep in mind that countries can be quite successful, in the
longer term, in bringing inﬂation down, but if a successful disinﬂation is
accompanied by a signiﬁcant instability of inﬂation (as evidenced by re-
peated large undershooting or overshooting of inﬂation targets), this can
be costly for the economy as well.
There is not yet much we can read from the history of inﬂation targeting
in Hungary because it is so recent (see ﬁgure 9.3). The 2001 target was an-
nounced only in August 2001, and it therefore was more of a short-term in-
ﬂation forecast than an actual inﬂation target. Therefore, the fact that Hun-
gary met this target and the 2002 target does not tell much about the
operation of its inﬂation-targeting framework. The inﬂation target for 2002
implied a fairly rapid disinﬂation, alongside the trend started in mid-2001.
In 2001 and 2002, disinﬂation was helped by the appreciation of the forint.
However, since the forint has reached the upper end of the ﬂuctuation band
and the government seems to resist the revaluation of parity, there is no room
for further nominal appreciation that would assist in further disinﬂation.
Table 9.4and ﬁgures 9.1 and 9.2, which show the history of inﬂation tar-
geting in the Czech Republic and Poland, tell a very diﬀerent story. In the
Czech Republic, the CNB signiﬁcantly undershot its inﬂation targets, par-
ticularly in 1998 and 1999, and less in 2000. Net inﬂation fell to 1.7 percent
at the end of 1998 and to 1.5 percent at the end of 1999, well below the
CNB’s targets. Only in 2001, in the fourth year of inﬂation targeting, did
the CNB succeed in achieving its inﬂation target, but it undershot its tar-
get again in 2002.
As we can see in ﬁgure 9.2, in Poland there was an opposite problem, as
the NBP signiﬁcantly overshot its targets in 1999 and 2000. In the course
of 1998, inﬂation in Poland was falling rapidly, and at the end of the year it
fell to 8.6 percent, less than the 9.5 percent projected. A more-rapid-than-
expected decline in inﬂation prompted the NBP to reduce early in 1999 its
Inﬂation Targeting in Transition Economies: Experience and Prospects 377target for end-1999, from 8–8.5 percent to 6.4–7.8 percent, a step that in
retrospect may seem to have been somewhat premature. If the NBP had
maintained its original target, 8–8.5 percent, it would have missed it by
only a very small margin. But in the course of 1999, inﬂation began to in-
crease again, and the 1999 target was missed by a signiﬁcant margin, as was
the 2000 target. Very tight monetary policy and slowing economic activity
helped to bring inﬂation down sharply in 2001, and subsequently the 2001
and 2002 targets were undershot quite sizably.
These repeated large deviations of actual inﬂation from the inﬂation tar-
get would seem to suggest that inﬂation targeting was not very successful
in the Czech Republic and Poland. But before we make any deﬁnitive judg-
ments about the success or failure of inﬂation targeting in these two coun-
tries, it is important to understand the reasons for such signiﬁcant devia-
tions of actual from targeted inﬂation. We have to examine more closely
both the domestic and the external economic circumstances that prevailed
during this period and that aﬀected actual inﬂation.
At the time when the CNB launched inﬂation targeting, inﬂation was ris-
ing quite rapidly, but at the same time the economy was already slipping
into a prolonged recession. The 1998 and 2000 inﬂation targets were spec-
iﬁed at the time when the CNB (and other public and private forecasters)
expected much stronger economic growth than actually materialized.24
However, with the onset of a major banking crisis in 1997–98, economic ac-
tivity fell and contributed to a much faster disinﬂation than was envisaged
by the CNB’s inﬂation targets.25Moreover, the 1997–98 ﬁnancial crises and
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Table 9.4 Targeted and actual inﬂation in the Czech Republic and Poland
Czech Republic  Poland 
(net inﬂation) (headline inﬂation)
Target Actual Target Actual
1998 5.5–6.5 1.7 n.a. 8.6
1999 4–5 1.5 6.4–7.8 (8–8.5)a 9.8
2000 3.5–5.5 3 5.4–6.8 8.5
2001 2–4 2.4 6–8 3.6
2002 2.75–4.75b 0.5 4–6 0.8
Source: Czech National Bank, National bank of Poland, various documents.
Note: n.a.   not applicable.
aInitial target in parentheses.
bHeadline inﬂation.
24. For example, the May 1998 World Economic Outlook projected real GDP growth in
1998 of 2.2 percent. This forecast was quite accurate, but with an opposite sign. Actual
growth was –2.2 percent.
25. Of course, the hotly debated question was whether and to what extent the CNB’s exces-
sively tight monetary itself contributed to slower-than-projected growth.weak global economic activity contributed to falling commodity prices,
including energy prices.26 The CNB calculations suggest that these exter-
nal factors had a sizeable eﬀect on net inﬂation: in 1998, these factors re-
duced net inﬂation by 2–3 percentage points (C ˇapek 1999, 9). In the absence
of these shocks, net inﬂation at the end of 1998 would probably have been
close to the bottom of the target range. There were also other structural
shocks that contributed to lower-than-projected inﬂation. Among the
more important was the continuing unexpected decline in foodstuﬀ prices
in 1998 and 1999. Ex post, the decline in foodstuﬀ prices was ascribed to
the struggle of the retail distributors for market share in the Czech market.
Weak domestic demand, together with strong koruna and strong compet-
itive pressure in the domestic economy resulting from penetration on the
Czech market of foreign distributors, continued to keep inﬂation low even
after the eﬀects of external price shocks began to disappear. In addition,
the decision not to exclude energy prices and to exclude adjustment of
regulated prices from the targeted price index did not achieve its objective
of encouraging the government to pursue a “courageous policy of price
deregulation,” as the CNB initially hoped.
When inﬂation targeting was introduced, Poland was facing very diﬀer-
ent economic circumstances from those of the Czech Republic. First, the
implications of global developments for domestic inﬂation were better
known to the NBP at that time and could be incorporated into the inﬂation
target. As in the Czech Republic, inﬂation in Poland declined signiﬁcantly
during 1998 and 1999, but this decline was less dramatic and did not last as
long. Already in the second half of 1999, inﬂation in Poland had begun to
exceed by an increasingly wider margin inﬂation in the Czech Republic.
Relatively rapid growth of domestic demand, increase in import prices,
and the monopolistic structure of some industries together resulted in the
reversal of disinﬂation in Poland in the course of 1999. Fiscal policy was
also much more expansionary than the NBP had expected, and this ex-
pansionary stance further fueled domestic demand.
The NBP responded to these developments with a signiﬁcant tightening
of monetary policy, and it continued to keep monetary conditions very
tight even when inﬂation began to fall sharply later in 2000 and in 2001.
This (to some excessively) tight monetary policy also brought economic
growth nearly to a halt by the end of 2001, and contributed to increased
tension between the NBP and the government, which even led by the end
of 2001 to threats of reduction of NBP independence. It appears that the
NBP tried to use a tight monetary policy stance as an instrument to force
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26. In U.S. dollar terms, oil prices fell by 31.2 percent, while nonfuel commodity prices fell
by 14.7 percent in 1998. See International Monetary Fund (1999). It should be noted that this
eﬀect of ﬁnancial crises contributed to an unexpected fall in inﬂation worldwide. The May
1997 IMF World Economic Outlook projected that in 1998 consumer prices in advanced
economies would increase by 2.5 percent, while the actual increase was only 1.5 percent.the government to strengthen structural ﬁscal balance, even at the cost of
signiﬁcant undershooting of its inﬂation target.
Judging by its success in meeting its inﬂation target, the NBP has not
been very successful thus far. In the ﬁrst two years, inﬂation targets were
overshot, and in the third and fourth years there was signiﬁcant under-
shooting. Recent years saw a signiﬁcant instability of inﬂation, which fell
rapidly from 17.8 percent in the beginning of 1997 to 5.6 percent in Febru-
ary 1999, then rose to 11.6 percent in July 2000, and fell again to 0.8 per-
cent in December 2002. In Poland, external factors may have been of less
importance in explaining the failure to meet inﬂation targets than in the
Czech Republic, while the conduct of macroeconomic policy probably
mattered more. First, unexpected ﬁscal expansion, combined with easy
monetary policy, contributed to the acceleration of inﬂation and over-
shooting of inﬂation targets; subsequently, sharp tightening of monetary
policy, in the absence of further easing of ﬁscal policy, reduced inﬂation
sharply down and produced a signiﬁcant undershooting of the target.
9.4.3 Comparison of Inﬂation and Output Performance of 
Inﬂation Targeters with Other Transition Countries
We have seen that hitting inﬂation targets has not been an easy exercise.
However, this may have been unavoidable given the shocks the inﬂation
targeters were subjected to. To assess the success of inﬂation targeting in
transition countries, we have to ask how well the inﬂation targeters have
done relative to the nontargeters.
There are two alternative monetary policy regimes to inﬂation targeting
that transition countries have chosen:
1. Exchange rate peg: a crawling peg for Hungary until August 2001, a
standard peg for Latvia (peg to SDR), and a hard peg of the currency
board type for Bulgaria, Estonia, and Latvia
2. Float without an inﬂation target: Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania27
Figures 9.4 and 9.5 compare inﬂation rates (year over year) in the Czech
Republic and Poland with those of the other transition countries. A rele-
vant starting date for comparing the diﬀerent monetary regimes is Decem-
ber 1998 (marked in the ﬁgures), which corresponds to the ﬁrst date that in-
ﬂation targets were to be met in the Czech Republic. As we can see in ﬁgure
9.4, which has a comparison with the non-inﬂation-targeting ﬂoaters, the
Czech Republic and Poland experienced lower levels of inﬂation for most
of the 1999–2002 period than did the non-inﬂation-targeting ﬂoaters. On
the other hand, ﬁgure 9.5, which has a comparison with the exchange rate
380 Jiri Jonas and Frederic S. Mishkin
27. The currency regimes of these countries are characterized as managed ﬂoats. In June
2001, Romania’s currency regime was reclassiﬁed from a managed ﬂoat to a crawling band be-






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.peggers, does not display a clear dominance of inﬂation targeting over peg-
ging. Hungary, with its soft peg, and Bulgaria, with its currency board,
have typically had higher inﬂation rates than the Czech Republic and
Poland; but Lithuania, with its currency board, and Latvia, with its stan-
dard peg, have experienced lower inﬂation rates. Estonia has had inﬂation
rates comparable to those in the Czech Republic, but up until the last half
of 2002 had lower inﬂation than Poland.
Clearly a low level of inﬂation is only one measure of success of mone-
tary regimes—equally important is the variability of inﬂation and output.
Table 9.5 provides the standard deviation of both inﬂation and output for
the period 1999–2002. Here we see that the Czech Republic and Poland are
in the middle of the pack on both criteria. The Czech Republic and Poland
have higher standard deviations of inﬂation than the hard-pegging Baltic
countries, while they have lower variability than Hungary, a soft pegger,
Bulgaria, a hard pegger, and Slovakia and Romania, non-inﬂation-
targeting ﬂoaters. Slovenia, a non-inﬂation-targeting ﬂoater, has equal in-
ﬂation variability to the Czech Republic but has lower variability than
Poland.
Although we should not make too much of the data in ﬁgures 9.4 and 9.5
and table 9.5 because they cover such a short period and because these
countries have been subjected to diﬀerent shocks, it is worth noting that in
terms of inﬂation control, inﬂation targeting does not clearly dominate the
other monetary policy regimes chosen by transition countries.
We reach a similar conclusion in terms of output variability as seen by
the standard deviations of output growth reported in table 9.5.28The Czech
Republic and Poland have had lower standard deviations than the hard
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Table 9.5 Inﬂation and output growth volatility: 1998–2002
Country Inﬂation volatility Output volatility










28. The mixed results reported here on the performance of inﬂation-targeting regimes rela-
tive to other monetary policy regimes is not very surprising. As argued by Calvo and Mish-
kin (2003), the choice of monetary policy regime is likely to be less important to the macro-
economic performance of emerging-market and transition countries than deeper institu-
tions.peggers, Bulgaria and the Baltic states, but have had higher standard devi-
ations than Slovakia and Slovenia, non-inﬂation-targeting ﬂoaters. Hun-
gary, a soft pegger for most of the period, had the lowest standard devia-
tion of output growth of all the countries in the table. However, even less
should be made of these comparisons, because real shocks have diﬀered
dramatically across the transition countries. For example, as we can see in
ﬁgure 9.6, the Baltic countries, which have a higher proportion of their
trade with Russia as a result of their having been part of the former Soviet
Union, suﬀered very dramatic output declines in 1999 in the aftermath of
the Russian ﬁnancial crisis in the fall of 1998. The contraction of the Rus-
sian economy at that time had a far smaller impact on transition countries
that were less integrated with Russia and whose trade was mostly with
Western Europe.
9.5 Lessons and Problems of Inﬂation Targeting in Transition Economies
Even though the experience of the implementation of inﬂation target-
ing in transition economies is relatively short, it has nevertheless brought
out several speciﬁc issues, which deserve discussion. First, how should the
standard operational aspects of inﬂation targeting be speciﬁed—that is,
what price index should be targeted? Should the inﬂation target be a point
or a range? And what should the horizon for the target be? Second, given
the fact that transition economies began inﬂation targeting in a situation
of higher inﬂation than the long-term objective, how should the speed of
disinﬂation be determined, and in a closely related question, how should
the government be involved in setting inﬂation targets? Third, how should
monetary policy respond to the deviation of the actual inﬂation from the
targeted disinﬂation path, and how much should the ﬂoor of an inﬂation
target be emphasized relative to the ceiling? Fourth, how should the ex-
change rate be incorporated into the inﬂation-targeting framework?
9.5.1 Operational Aspects of Inﬂation Targeting
What Measure of Inﬂation to Target?
In deciding what measure of inﬂation to target, central banks face a
trade-oﬀbetween transparency and the ability to control inﬂation. The ad-
vantage of a broadly deﬁned headline inﬂation (i.e., the consumer price in-
dex) is that it is better understood by the public. However, the problem is
that headline movements could reﬂect factors other than monetary policy
measures. A more narrowly deﬁned measure of inﬂation that excludes pos-
sible eﬀects of transitory shocks could be better controlled by a central
bank, but at the same time it could be more diﬃcult for the public to assess
the conduct of monetary policy on the basis of such measure. Given the
emphasis on central banks’ accountability and transparency in a regime of

















































































































































































































































































































































.inﬂation targeting, this could potentially be a serious handicap, particu-
larly for a central bank that still has to earn its credibility.
The CNB opted for a compromise that it considered most appropriate
for an economy in transition. For the purpose of inﬂation targeting, it in-
troduced a new concept, so-called net inﬂation, which excluded regulated
prices (see section 9.3.1). Speciﬁc conditions of economic transition have
played an important role in selecting net inﬂation as the targeted measure
of inﬂation. Unlike in industrial countries, many prices were still regulated
in the Czech Republic in late 1997. The CNB knew that substantial
changes in these regulated prices, including rents, would be needed before
they reached a market-clearing level. As a result, a given monetary policy
stance could produce diﬀerent future paths of headline inﬂation, depend-
ing on the pace of price deregulation or the size of adjustment of admin-
istered prices. At the same time, this approach was supposed to avoid a
situation in which the government would be hesitant to pursue a faster
adjustment of regulated prices out of concern that the inﬂationary eﬀects
of such policy would force the CNB to tighten monetary policy, with ad-
verse eﬀects on economic growth, thus exacerbating the political cost of
deregulation. Indeed, the former acting governor of the CNB, Pavel
Kysilka, stated that “by targeting net inﬂation, we have provided a room
to the government to pursue a courageous policy of price deregulation”
(Kysilka 1998, 10–12). Obviously, a high share of regulated prices in total
CPI does not make it easier for the central bank to deal with this trade-oﬀ
between transparency and ability to control inﬂation.29
Subsequently, the pace of price deregulation and increase in adminis-
tered prices was less than the CNB had hoped, and so use of the net inﬂa-
tion construct did not produce the desirable outcome the CNB expected.
In addition, the net inﬂation construct turned out to be more volatile than
headline inﬂation, helping to contribute to larger misses of the target.
When it decided to target net inﬂation, the CNB did not exclude the possi-
bility that in the future it could modify the measure of targeted inﬂation.
The problems with the net inﬂation measure thus led the CNB to abandon
it in April 2001, and it subsequently moved to targeting headline inﬂation
as has been discussed in section 9.3.1.
Target a Point or a Range?
As in other aspects of design of the operational framework, there is a
trade-oﬀ involved in deciding about the width of the band. A wider band
increases the chance that monetary policy will be successful in keeping tar-
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29. The Czech economy is very open, with imports representing about 50 percent of GDP,
and changes in import prices of oil and gas have a large impact on domestic prices. However,
at the time of the introduction of inﬂation targeting, the CNB had considered isolating the
eﬀects of price deregulation as more important than isolating the eﬀects of terms-of-trade
shocks or exchange rate eﬀects.geted inﬂation inside. But a too-large band could reduce the ability of in-
ﬂation targeting to anchor inﬂation expectations, and it could be of less
help in establishing the antiinﬂationary credibility. Some argue that a band
that is narrow enough to anchor inﬂationary expectations is likely to be fre-
quently missed, and that it is preferable to target a point and explain the
deviations of actual inﬂation from that point target (Bernanke et al. 1999;
Mishkin 2001).
In a sense, one can argue that a higher degree of uncertainty in project-
ing inﬂation and a correspondingly higher probability that even a target
range would be missed makes the issue of point versus range less of an is-
sue than in more advanced inﬂation-targeting economies. By setting a
range, the central bank may indicate what is its estimate of uncertainty of
reaching the inﬂation target. This is how the CNB has explained its deci-
sion regarding the width of the targeted range. Missing a target range then
carries a larger risk of credibility loss than missing a target point. Target-
ing a reasonably narrow band (that is, narrow enough so that it provides a
suﬃcient nominal anchor) does not make much sense when the probabil-
ity that it would be missed is not signiﬁcantly less than the probability of
missing a point.
Time Horizon of Inﬂation Targeting
Monetary policy aﬀects the economy and particularly inﬂation with
long lags. In industrialized countries, lags from monetary policy to inﬂa-
tion are typically estimated to be on the order of two years. Shorter time
horizons, such as one year, can be highly problematic. The ﬁrst problem
with too short a horizon is that it can lead to a controllability problem: too-
frequent misses of the inﬂation target, even when monetary policy is being
conducted optimally. The second problem is that it can lead to instrument
instability, in which policy instruments are moved around too much in or-
der to try to get inﬂation to hit its targets over the shorter horizon. A third
problem is that too short a horizon implies that not enough weight is put
on output ﬂuctuations in the central bank’s loss function.30
The experience with inﬂation targeting in New Zealand documented in
Bernanke et al. (1999) illustrates these problems. In 1995, the Reserve Bank
of New Zealand overshot its one-year-horizon inﬂation target range, mak-
ing the governor subject to dismissal under the central-banking law. It was
recognized in the Reserve Bank that the overshoot was likely to be short-
lived and inﬂation was likely to fall, indicating that monetary policy had
not been overly expansionary. Fortunately, this view was accepted outside
the Bank, and the governor, Don Brash, whose performance was excellent,
retained his job. Attempting to hit the annual target did, however, have the
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30. As demonstrated by Svensson (1997), a faster target path of inﬂation to the long-run in-
ﬂation goal implies a smaller weight on output variability in the central bank’s loss function.unfortunate consequence of producing excessive swings in the monetary
policy instruments, especially the exchange rate. In a small, open economy,
like New Zealand, exchange rate movements have a faster impact on inﬂa-
tion than interest rates. Thus, trying to achieve annual inﬂation targets re-
quired heavier reliance on manipulating exchange rates, which led to its
having large swings. By trying to hit the short-horizon target, the Reserve
Bank also may have induced greater output ﬂuctuations. For example, the
Reserve Bank pursued overly tight monetary policy at the end of 1996 with
the overnight cash rate going to 10 percent because of fears that inﬂation
would rise above the target range in 1997, and this led to an undesirable de-
cline in output. The Reserve Bank has recognized the problems it had with
a too-short target horizon and now emphasizes a horizon of six to eight
quarters in their discussions of monetary policy (Sherwin 1999; Drew and
Orr 1999). Furthermore, the Policy Target Agreement between the central
bank and the government has recently been amended to be more ﬂexible in
order to support the longer policy horizon (Reserve Bank of New Zealand
2000).
The solution to avoiding too short a horizon for the inﬂation target is to
set inﬂation targets for periods two years ahead (or longer). This automat-
ically implies that the central bank will have multiyear inﬂation targets.
The target for the current calendar year will have been set two years previ-
ously, while there will also be a target for the following year. With multiyear
targets, the target from one year to the next could vary over time. The in-
ﬂation target would vary in response to shocks to the economy, especially
to supply shocks, which might need to be accommodated in order to keep
output ﬂuctuations from becoming excessive. Also, putting a weight on
output ﬂuctuations in a central bank’s objectives, as is sensible, means that
the approach of the inﬂation target to the long-run goal needs to be grad-
ual (Svennson 1997). This also suggests the need for multiyear targets in
which the inﬂation target, even one for two years ahead, may diﬀer from
the long-run target if shocks to the economy have driven inﬂation away
from the long-run goal.
Initially, the horizons for inﬂation targets in the transition countries
studied here were short, being on the order of a year, and this may have
contributed to the controllability problem and the frequent target misses.
Possibly in response to these problems, the CNB was the ﬁrst to specify a
long-term inﬂation target for a horizon of ﬁve years, and the NBH and the
NBP have also speciﬁed medium-term inﬂation targets (see table 9.2).
9.5.2 Who Should Set the Inﬂation Target and 
Decide the Speed of Disinﬂation?
In the 1990s, there was a signiﬁcant shift worldwide toward more inde-
pendent central banks, partly in response to a better understanding of eco-
nomic costs of political interference with monetary policy and high inﬂa-
388 Jiri Jonas and Frederic S. Mishkintion. While not all central banks were given complete freedom to set mon-
etary policy targets, most of them gained instrument independence—that
is, the freedom to conduct monetary policy without external interference
to meet the objective. Among economists, there seems now to be a consen-
sus that central banks should have instrument independence—that is, in-
dependence to conduct monetary policy so as to meet the inﬂation target
or other monetary policy objective. There also seems to be a consensus that
central banks should not have goal independence—independence to set
inﬂation targets or other monetary policy objectives (Fischer 1994).
From the early stages of economic transition, central banks in all three
countries have received a signiﬁcant degree of de jure independence, not
only in the conduct of monetary policy (instrument independence) but also
in setting the objectives of monetary policy (goal independence).
In the Czech Republic, the independence of the central bank was an-
chored in the Constitution, which stated that the government might inter-
vene in the CNB’s aﬀairs only for reasons clearly outlined in the Act on
CNB. The Act on CNB (No. 6/1993 of Collection of Laws) speciﬁed that
the primary objective of the CNB is to ensure the stability of the Czech na-
tional currency (Article 2) and that the CNB Board should set monetary
policy and the instruments for the implementation of these policies (Ar-
ticle 5). Moreover, the Act explicitly states that in providing for its primary
objective the CNB shall be independent of any instructions given by the
government. The governor, vice-governors, and members of the Board are
appointed and recalled by the president (Article 6). The Act was subse-
quently amended in 2002, and the main objective of the CNB was changed
to maintaining price stability, with the standard qualiﬁcation that without
prejudice to its primary objective the CNB shall support economic policies
of the government leading to sustainable economic growth. The amended
Act also states that “when providing for the primary objective of the CNB
and when carrying out their activities, neither the CNB nor the CNB
Board shall seek or take instructions from the President of the republics,
from Parliament, from the Government, from administrative authorities
or from any other body” (Article 9). The appointment of the governor and
other CNB oﬃcials remains fully the responsibility of the president.
In Hungary, the Act on NBH was passed in October 1991 and reinstated
the independence of the NBH. It has been amended several times since.
The latest version, from June 2001 (Act LVIII of 2001), states that the pri-
mary objective of the NBH shall be to achieve and maintain price stability
(Article 3) and that the NBH shall deﬁne and implement monetary policy
in the interest of maintaining the stability of the national currency (Article
4). Article 6 states that “within the framework provided for by this Act, the
NBH shall independently deﬁne its monetary policy and the instruments
for implementing such policy.” Article 38 stipulates that the government
may not instruct the NBH in relation to its scope of tasks as set forth in the
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president of the Republic at the proposal of the prime minister. The presi-
dent of the Republic also appoints vice presidents and other members of
the Monetary Council.
The legal position of the NBP is similar. The Act on the NBP of August
29, 1997, stipulates that the basic objective of the NBP shall be to maintain
price stability, again with the addition that the NBP shall at the same time
support government economic policies, insofar as this does not constrain
pursuit of the basic objective (Article 3). The president of the NBP shall be
appointed by the Sejm, at the request of the president of the Republic, for
a period of six years. The vice presidents and other members of the NBP
Management Board are appointed by the president of the Republic at the
request of the president of the NBP. The nine members of the Monetary
Policy Council (MPC) are appointed in equal numbers by the president of
the Republics, the Sejm, and the Senate (Article 13). The responsibility of
the MPC is to draw annual monetary policy guidelines and submit them to
the Sejm for information (Article 12). Article 21 stipulates that in dis-
charging its responsibilities the NBP shall collaborate with the appropriate
bodies of the central government in developing and implementing national
economic policy and strive to ensure proper performance of monetary pol-
icy guidelines. It should submit monetary policy guidelines to the bodies of
the central government and report on the performance of monetary policy.
However, de jure independence does not always imply a de facto inde-
pendence. While the NBP is not explicitly forbidden by the Act on NBP to
seek instructions from the government and other bodies in pursuing its re-
sponsibilities, de facto, it decides alone on inﬂation targets. On the other
hand, the NBH is de jure independent and forbidden to seek instruction,
but in practice, the governor of the NBH seeks government endorsement
for the NBH’s monetary policy objectives.
The eﬀort to make central banks legally independent reﬂected the belief
of reformist governments and parliaments that politics should not inter-
fere with the conduct of monetary policy. To a large extent, central-bank
legislature in these countries was modeled after the German Bundesbank,
which itself—for historical reasons—enjoyed a high degree of independ-
ence. In the early years of transition, no one really questioned the high
degree of central-bank independence in the transition countries, as gov-
ernments had to deal with the more urgent tasks of liberalization, privati-
zation, and so on. However, the high degree of central-bank independence
eventually became a source of tension.
These tensions appeared ﬁrst in the Czech Republic. As we have dis-
cussed, in the early years of inﬂation targeting the CNB repeatedly under-
shot its inﬂation target, while economic growth turned negative. In many
countries, this would probably have been suﬃcient to create tensions be-
tween central bank and government. In the Czech Republic, these tensions
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sult of the poor state of the economy in the aftermath of the currency tur-
bulence of 1997, the main pro-reform party split and new elections were
called for mid-1998. In the meantime, a caretaker government was formed
and the CNB governor became a caretaker prime minister. When a new
government was formed after the election, he returned to the CNB. In-
evitably, this drew the CNB further into politics, exactly the opposite of
what the high degree of de jure independence was supposed to achieve.
The party that lost the election in 1998 criticized the CNB and the gov-
ernor for mishandling monetary policy, contributing to economic decline,
and thus aﬀecting the outcome of the elections. The CNB was considered
to be too independent and unwilling to coordinate monetary policy with
the economic policy of the government. The speed of disinﬂation was con-
sidered as excessive, hurting economic growth. This criticism eventually re-
sulted in legislative eﬀort to curb the CNB’s independence. When the CNB
and the new government introduced jointly to Parliament an amendment
to the CNB Act to bring it in line with EU standards, members of the party
that lost the 1998 election submitted their own amendment that aimed at
signiﬁcantly reducing the CNB’s independence. They proposed for Parlia-
ment to supervise and approve the operational budget, salaries of Board
members to be cut, monetary policy decisions to be made in consultation
with the government, and political parties to have more say in appointing
the governor and Board members.
This proposal was strongly criticized by domestic and foreign ﬁnancial
analysts, by the International Monetary Fund, and—most importantly—
by the EU and European Central Bank. Central-bank independence is a
requirement for both EU and EMU membership, and this argument ulti-
mately carried the most weight because of the planned accession of the
Czech Republic into the EU/EMU. In the end, the CNB retained its inde-
pendence, and with the appointment of new governor in 2000 the relation-
ship with the government improved as well.
Similar tensions between the central bank and the government emerged
in Poland during 2000 and 2001. As economic growth began to falter while
interest rates remained high, the NBP was blamed by some politicians for
having set its monetary policy excessively tight and for contributing to sub-
par growth performance. Tensions between the government and the NBP
accelerated in October 2001, after the new government took oﬃce. Con-
tributing to the tensions was the fact that the president of the NBP, Leszek
Balcerowicz, was himself a former politician and main author of the cold-
turkey stabilization program that was criticized by the center-left politi-
cians who formed the government after the October 2001 elections.
The prime minister and other members of the cabinet have repeatedly at-
tacked the MPC for keeping interest rates too high. The pressure to reduce
the NBP’s independence rose, and some members of Parliament from the
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tives to include economic growth and employment, and to increase the
number of members of the MPC. Even though the government did not for-
mally back these proposals, being well aware that this would complicate
the EU/EMU accession, it did not mind using them as a tool to put pres-
sure on the NBP to ease monetary policy. Because accession to EU/EMU
is an important objective for Poland, it is not likely that these initiatives will
succeed.
The Polish experience also illustrates the peril of central-bank eﬀort to
use monetary policy as a tool to force the government to pursue a more dis-
ciplined ﬁscal policy. The NBP tried to use tight monetary policy to pres-
sure the government to improve structural ﬁscal balance, and kept interest
rates very high even as inﬂation was falling below its target and growth
came nearly to a halt. But instead of achieving this objective, the NBP only
antagonized the government and put its independence under risk.
Even Hungary was not spared tensions between the central bank and the
government. Recently, the government put forward a bill that proposed to
set up a Supervisory Committee within the NBH. This committee would
comprise delegates of political parties and two persons appointed by the
minister of ﬁnance. Such a committee already existed in the past but was
abolished. The NBH argued that such a step would infringe on NBH’s op-
erational independence and would go against the EU requirements on cen-
tral-bank independence. Members of the government have also pressured
the NBH to reduce interest rates in order to support growth. They argued
that the NBH should not focus too much on inﬂation.
In Hungary, the reasons for this pressure on the central bank were
mainly political and personal. The new NBH president who was appointed
in 2001 was a former minister of ﬁnance, and from this position he had
been exercising pressure on his predecessor. However, the previous NBH
president is in close contact with the present prime minister and has used
this relationship to put pressure on his successor. More recently, the con-
ﬂict between the inﬂation target and exchange rate target has further in-
creased these tensions.
Why do we see these tensions in all three inﬂation-targeting countries?
There are several reasons. First, at the beginning of transition, central
banks were given a large degree of both operational and goal independ-
ence. In a situation where inﬂation is still higher than the long-term objec-
tive of price stability, this means that central banks are given the freedom
to decide on the speed of disinﬂation. As central bankers tend to be more
ambitious with respect to the speed of disinﬂation than politicians, this
creates the potential for tensions. These tensions tend to come into the
open once economic growth falters, particularly if this poor growth per-
formance is perceived as contributing to a loss of popularity of the gov-
erning party or parties. In our view, this experience suggests the superior-
392 Jiri Jonas and Frederic S. Mishkinity of closer involvement with political authorities in setting monetary pol-
icy objectives. Particularly in the diﬃcult period of economic transition, a
goal of independence of central banks may complicate rather than facili-
tate the conduct of monetary policy.
Second, the fact that politicians became central-bank governors, or that
central-bank governors stepped into politics, had the unwanted conse-
quence of drawing central banks more into the political arena. Finally, de-
spite signiﬁcant progress in economic and political reforms, the rule of law
still remains less ﬁrmly established even in the most advanced transition
economies, making politically motivated attacks on central banks more
likely.
Public disputes between the central bank and the government of the
kind that we have seen in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary are not
desirable. They undermine the credibility of the inﬂation-targeting frame-
work and could increase the costs of future disinﬂation. As we have already
noted, the decision about the speed of disinﬂation has a diﬀerent impact
on diﬀerent groups in the society, and there is thus a strong case for such a
decision to be made by a politically responsible body like the government.
Clearly, it would better serve the credibility of monetary policy if the speed
of disinﬂation were the result of a joint decision by a central bank and the
government, although this is obviously not a practice in all inﬂation-
targeting countries.31 Such a joint decision would have several advantages.
Most important, it would be more credible. When a government decides
(perhaps jointly with a central bank) on the speed of disinﬂation, it is ex-
plicitly or implicitly committing itself to policies supporting this disinﬂa-
tion objective. The speed of disinﬂation (co)decided by government would
be seen by markets as a political decision that takes into account possible
short-term trade-oﬀs, and it would reduce the probability that policies sup-
porting the achievement of targeted disinﬂation would be challenged on
grounds that they do not reﬂect the preferences of the society and that they
are unduly costly.
Even in situations where the ultimate responsibility for deciding on the
speed of disinﬂation would rest with the government, the central bank
could still provide important input into this decision by voicing (possibly
publicly) its own views about the desirable speed of disinﬂation. Of course,
there is a risk that the government would choose too slow a disinﬂation.
However, it is not clear whether this would impose higher costs on the
economy than a unilateral decision by a central bank to pursue a more
rapid disinﬂation that would subsequently be challenged by the govern-
ment as being too ambitious. Furthermore, a unilateral decision by the
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31. Such arrangement need not necessarily imply a formal subordination of the central
bank to the government in setting inﬂation targets. For example, in Australia, the inﬂation
target is set by a central bank alone, and the government subsequently publicly endorses this
target.central bank to pursue rapid disinﬂation is likely to weaken support for the
central bank, as has occurred in the Czech Republic and Poland. This in-
creases the risk of loss of independence and interferes with the ability of the
central bank to control inﬂation in a longer-run context.
The question of who should set inﬂation targets has a speciﬁc aspect in
transition economies that are expected soon to adopt the euro. One can ar-
gue that when the political decision to adopt the euro is made, it eﬀectively
speciﬁes both the disinﬂation path and the ultimate inﬂation target. The in-
ﬂation target is determined by the need to meet the Maastricht criterion
concerning maximum permissible inﬂation, and the speed with which this
inﬂation is to be achieved is determined by the timing of the euro adoption.
To the extent that there is a ﬁrm political commitment to adopt the euro at
a certain date, it becomes to a large extent irrelevant whether the inﬂation
target is set by a central bank or a government. The government does not
have much room to be more lenient on inﬂation than the central bank, be-
cause of the possibly large economic and mainly political costs of not meet-
ing the Maastricht criteria.
9.5.3 How Should a Bank Respond to Deviations of Inﬂation from 
the Target, and How Much Should the Floor of an Inﬂation 
Target Be Emphasized Relative to the Ceiling?
The implementation of inﬂation targeting in the Czech Republic and
Poland has brought out an interesting problem that arises in other inﬂa-
tion-targeting economies as well: how should a bank respond to a signiﬁ-
cant deviation of inﬂation from the inﬂation target? If the inﬂation rate
overshoots the ceiling of the target range, then the logic of inﬂation target-
ing clearly requires the central bank to bring the inﬂation rate back into the
target range. However, should an inﬂation-targeting central bank try to
lock in a lower-than-targeted inﬂation once actual inﬂation falls below the
targeted path if inﬂation is not yet at the long-run goal? Another way of
asking this question is to ask whether a central bank should emphasize the
ﬂoor of the inﬂation target as much as the ceiling and thus work as hard to
avoid undershoots of the target as overshoots.
As we have noted, the CNB signiﬁcantly undershot its inﬂation target in
1998 and 1999, and less so in 2000. Similarly, at the end of 2001, inﬂation in
Poland fell well below the NBP end-2001 target. What should central banks
do in such situations? Should they be upset at the undershoot and indicate
that this was a serious mistake? Alternatively, would it be appropriate for
them to lock in the unexpectedly rapid disinﬂation of previous two years
and focus monetary policy on maintaining price stability from then on?
A case could be made for acting opportunistically and using faster-than-
expected disinﬂation to lock in this windfall beneﬁt of lower inﬂation (Hal-
dane 1999). This is what Poland has tried to do by adjusting its original
end-1999 inﬂation target after actual inﬂation early in 1999 began to fall
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to less than the central bank target but still remains above the level of in-
ﬂation corresponding to price stability, it would make no sense to let inﬂa-
tion go up again only to be forced to reduce it again later. Disinﬂation, even
at a moderate pace, could be costly, and if a country can avoid the need to
disinﬂate in the future, this should spare the economy some loss of output.
Whether past faster-than-planned disinﬂation was a result of luck or mis-
takenly tight monetary policy may seem not to matter—bygones are by-
gones, past costs, if any, have been incurred, and let’s just avoid any future
costs of disinﬂation.32
In practice, central banks have treated the ﬂoors of inﬂation-target
ranges in diﬀerent ways (Clifton 1999). Some treat them as seriously as up-
per sides of a band and have eased monetary policy to bring inﬂation back
up inside the band (e.g., New Zealand in 1991), while others preferred to
consolidate the unexpected rapid disinﬂation (Israel in 1998).
The recent experience of Poland has shown the risks of trying to lock
into inﬂation that is lower than originally targeted. There are several prob-
lems with opportunistic disinﬂation and with treating the bottom of the
band leniently. First, there is a possibility that opportunistic disinﬂation
will not ﬁnd much sympathy with politicians. Particularly if the disinﬂation
that is faster than originally intended coincides with a signiﬁcant weaken-
ing of economic activity, there will be calls for a relaxation of monetary
policy, even if this should mean a return to somewhat higher inﬂation. The
NBP has exacerbated this problem because its inﬂation target is now stated
to be less than 4 percent, suggesting that they are not particularly disturbed
by undershooting the inﬂation target. This may have contributed substan-
tially to the poor relations between the NBP and the government and the
decrease in public support for the NBP. The CNB was well aware of the
danger from its undershoots of the inﬂation target and did not even suggest
that it could lock in the lower-than-targeted inﬂation.
Second, if rapid disinﬂation is a result of temporary external shocks like
large declines in the price of commodities, it would be a mistake to assume
that monetary policy could lock in such disinﬂation forever without large
future costs. Once these shocks are over, prices of commodities usually do
not stay low but rise again as global demand recovers. Monetary policy
that would try to prevent an accelerated pace of disinﬂation in times of de-
clining commodity prices or other positive supply shocks would probably
be too expansive. In the same vein, monetary policy would risk being too
restrictive if it tried to avoid any acceleration of inﬂation as positive supply
shocks are reversed.33 Like many other inﬂation-targeting central banks,
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32. Of course, such an argument could be made only if inﬂation does not fall below the
long-term inﬂation target corresponding to price stability.
33. If a positive price shock was permanent, perhaps as a result of a sudden increase in pro-
ductivity, it would be appropriate to accommodate the eﬀect of such shocks on inﬂation.the CNB has explicitly recognized that monetary policy should not at-
tempt to oﬀset temporary supply shocks that knock disinﬂation from its
projected path.
Third, an opportunistic approach to disinﬂation could undermine the
credibility of an inﬂation-targeting framework. By setting medium-term
inﬂation targets, central banks attempt to establish a predictable environ-
ment that would allow economic agents to plan for the future. Even though
there could and will be deviations from the target, credible inﬂation tar-
geting would lead the agents to expect that a central bank would do its best
to return actual inﬂation to the targeted path. Attempts at opportunistic
disinﬂation could increase the uncertainty, because they would make mon-
etary policy less predictable. For example, economic agents could expect
that central banks would adjust an inﬂation target upward in case of a neg-
ative shock as well.
However, a situation may arise where the path of disinﬂation has been
set incorrectly. For example, competitive pressures in the economy due to
liberalization, privatization, and a more open trade would produce a faster
disinﬂation for a given monetary policy stance than originally expected.
These favorable supply shocks would be likely to cause inﬂation to under-
shoot without leading to a decline in output. In this case, maintaining the
original disinﬂation target would require an overly expansionary monetary
policy, and it would seem to be more appropriate to accept in such a case a
disinﬂation that is faster than originally intended. This would also likely be
politically feasible because the undershoot of the inﬂation target would not
be accompanied by output losses.
9.5.4 Inﬂation Targets and the Exchange Rate
In the recent literature on inﬂation targeting, particularly on inﬂation
targeting in emerging-market countries, increased attention has been paid
to the open-economy aspect of inﬂation targeting (Mishkin 2000; Mishkin
and Savastano 2001; Eichengreen 2001). It has been recognized that the
large degree of openness of some emerging-market economies, in combi-
nation with speciﬁc characteristics of their ﬁnancial systems, creates addi-
tional challenges for the implementation of inﬂation targeting. Exchange
rate movements directly aﬀect domestic inﬂation, both as a result of exter-
nal shocks and as a result of monetary policy measures. The open-
economy aspect of inﬂation targeting plays a prominent role in inﬂation-
targeting transition economies as well.
In the initial stage of transition, all three inﬂation-targeting countries
analyzed in this paper used a ﬁxed exchange rate as a nominal anchor to
import price stability and bring domestic inﬂation quickly down. The cur-
rency peg–based stabilization was quite eﬀective, because it allowed them
to bring down inﬂation relatively quickly. The initial monetary overhang
was eliminated by a one-time increase in price level rather than by a sus-
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in inﬂation expectations.
However, ﬁrst Poland, then the Czech Republic, and ﬁnally Hungary
abandoned the currency peg and moved to more ﬂexible exchange rate
arrangements. This has fundamentally changed the operation of monetary
policy and the operation of the monetary transmission mechanism.
The importance of the exchange rate channel of monetary policy de-
pends directly on the degree of openness of the economy to trade ﬂows and
on the degree of integration into international capital markets. The Czech
Republic and Hungary are very open economies with respect to trade
ﬂows: the share of exports plus imports in gross domestic product (GDP)
exceeds 100 percent. Poland is a more closed economy: the share of exports
plus imports reaches “only” about 50 percent. Therefore, exchange rate
movements in the Czech Republic and Hungary will have a more impor-
tant eﬀect on domestic prices and inﬂation, and thus on inﬂation targeting.
At the same time, all three countries are very open to international capital
ﬂows, because in preparation for EU membership they have largely com-
pleted capital account liberalization.
There are several reasons why exchange rate movements are important
for inﬂation targeting in transition countries (Svensson 2000). First, ex-
change rate movements provide an additional transmission channel of
monetary policy. While in a closed economy aggregate demand and expec-
tation channels dominate, in open economy the exchange rate channel may
be the most important one, particularly in the short run. The exchange rate
transmission channel operates both directly and indirectly. Changes in
nominal exchange rate directly aﬀect the domestic prices of imported ﬁnal
goods and thus the targeted CPI index.34Indirectly, the exchange rate chan-
nel operates by aﬀecting domestic demand. Changes in real exchange rate
aﬀect domestic and foreign demand for domestic goods, thus enhancing
the standard aggregate-demand channel. Second, the exchange rate is one
channel through which foreign disturbances could be transmitted into the
domestic economy. Third, transition countries also have a particular con-
cern with their exchange rates because they want to become part of the EU
and the euro zone. Thus they must eventually ﬁx their exchange rates to the
euro as part of their planned entry into the EMU and so naturally care
more about the exchange rate at which they will convert their currency into
the euro upon accession.
Finally, it should be noted that emerging-market countries and transi-
tion economies are usually more vulnerable to large exchange rate move-
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34. The CPI includes prices of both domestic and imported goods. Consequently, it repre-
sents a combined measure of domestic inﬂation and imported inﬂation. Domestic inﬂation is
also aﬀected indirectly by changes in prices of imported goods. Changing the price of im-
ported input used for the production of domestic goods would aﬀect costs and—depending
on the extent of the pass-through—domestic prices.ments. The reason is the underdeveloped capital market in domestic cur-
rency and the need to borrow in dollars or other foreign currency, except
for very short-term borrowing. This results in open foreign exchange posi-
tions of banks and/or corporations and thus increased vulnerability of
their balance sheets to large exchange rate movements. While large appre-
ciation can make domestic producers uncompetitive (both in foreign and
domestic markets), large depreciation could cause substantial damage to
ﬁrms or banks with large open foreign exchange positions and precipitate
a ﬁnancial crisis of the type described in Mishkin (1996, 1999).
While it is generally recognized that in such open economies as the
Czech Republic and Hungary the exchange rate represents both an impor-
tant channel of monetary transmission and an important channel of trans-
mission of external disturbances, it is less obvious what the implications
are for the treatment of the exchange rate in the regime of inﬂation target-
ing. We can distinguish two approaches to the exchange rate: an active and
a passive approach. In an active approach, the central bank cares about the
exchange rate over and above its eﬀects on inﬂation and actively tries to in-
ﬂuence the level of the exchange rate. In a passive approach, a central bank
cares about the exchange rate only to the extent that it aﬀects aggregate
demand and the inﬂation rate, and it does not try to directly manipulate
the exchange rate, only reacting to changes in exchange rate that would
threaten its inﬂation target.35
As we have noted, the Czech Republic and Hungary are particularly
open economies, and the exchange rate will therefore have an important
eﬀect on inﬂation and other variables. Poland is less open, and exchange
rate movements seem to play a less important role in monetary policy de-
liberations. It seems that the NBH is pursuing this active approach, to
judge from its statements on the role of the exchange rate in aﬀecting in-
ﬂation outcomes. As Orlowski (2000) argues, in Hungary, the central bank
has focused its monetary policy on exchange rate stability, and for this rea-
son changes in the exchange rates have a strong eﬀect on inﬂation. Such a
strong eﬀect was not observed in the Czech Republic and Poland. This may
explain the relatively larger emphasis put by the NBH on the exchange rate
channel of monetary policy.
The problem is that too much reliance on the exchange rate channel of
monetary transmission carries the risk that a central bank would focus ex-
cessively on a short-term horizon. In open economies, the exchange rate
channel not only is important but operates very fast, because changes in
exchange rate directly aﬀect domestic prices of imported ﬁnal goods, and
with longer but still potentially quite short lag prices of domestic goods
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35. Again, we can distinguish a more or less active use of this passive approach, depending
on the time horizon during which the central bank would try to meet the inﬂation target by
responding to exogenous exchange rate changes.containing imported inputs. This rapid transmission may induce the inﬂa-
tion-targeting central bank into too much of a focus on a short-term hori-
zon and into an eﬀort to keep actual inﬂation in line with the inﬂation tar-
get by orchestrating exchange rate changes. However, excessive use of the
exchange rate channel could have undesirable consequences. It could cause
a problem of instrument instability and result in excessive variability of
real exchange rate,—and thus in an increased degree of uncertainty in the
economy and higher variability of output.36 In addition, it runs the risk of
transforming the exchange rate into a nominal anchor that takes prece-
dence over the inﬂation target. For example, as documented in Bernanke et
al. (1999), Israel’s intermediate target of an exchange rate around a crawl-
ing peg did slow the Bank of Israel’s eﬀort to win support for disinﬂation
and lowering of the inﬂation targets in the early years of its inﬂation-
targeting regime. In addition, an active focus on the exchange rate may in-
duce the wrong policy response when a country is faced with real shocks
such as a terms-of-trade shock. Two graphic examples of these problems
are illustrated by the experiences of New Zealand and Chile in the late
1990s.
The short horizon for the inﬂation target in New Zealand led the Reserve
Bank to focus on the exchange rate as an indicator of the monetary policy
stance because of the direct impact of exchange rate movements on inﬂa-
tion. By early 1997, the Reserve Bank institutionalized this focus by adopt-
ing as its primary indicator of monetary policy a Monetary Conditions In-
dex (MCI) similar to that developed by the Bank of Canada. The idea
behind the MCI, which is a weighted average of the exchange rate and a
short-term interest rate, is that both interest rates and exchange rates on
average have oﬀsetting impacts on inﬂation. When the exchange rate falls,
this usually leads to higher inﬂation in the future, and so interest rates need
to rise to oﬀset the upward pressure on inﬂation. However, the oﬀsetting
eﬀects of interest rates and exchange rates on inﬂation depend on the na-
ture of the shocks to the exchange rates. If the exchange rate depreciation
comes from portfolio considerations, then it does lead to higher inﬂation
and needs to be oﬀset by an interest rate rise. However, if the reason for the
exchange rate depreciation is a real shock, such as a negative terms-of-
trade shock, which decreases the demand for a country’s exports, then the
situation is entirely diﬀerent. The negative terms-of-trade shock reduces
aggregate demand and is thus likely to be deﬂationary. The correct interest
rate response is then a decline in interest rates, not a rise as the MCI sug-
gests.
With the negative terms-of-trade shock in 1997, the adoption of the MCI
in 1997 led to exactly the wrong monetary policy response to the East
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36. This risk seems to be well recognized by the NBH. See National Bank of Hungary
(2001, 35–36).Asian crisis. With depreciation setting in after the crisis began in July 1997
after the devaluation of the Thai baht, the MCI began a sharp decline, in-
dicating that the Reserve Bank needed to raise interest rates, which it did
by over 200 basis points. The result was very tight monetary policy, with the
overnight cash rate exceeding 9 percent by June of 1998. Because the de-
preciation was due to a substantial, negative terms-of-trade shock that de-
creased aggregate demand, the tightening of monetary policy, not surpris-
ingly, led to a severe recession and an undershoot of the inﬂation target
range, with actual deﬂation occurring in 1999.37 The Reserve Bank of New
Zealand did eventually realize its mistake and reversed course, sharply
lowering interest rates beginning in July 1998 after the economy had en-
tered a recession, but by then it was too late. It also recognized the prob-
lems with using an MCI as an indicator of monetary policy and abandoned
it in 1999. Now the Reserve Bank operates monetary policy in a more con-
ventional way, using the overnight cash rate as its policy instrument, with
far less emphasis on the exchange rate in its monetary policy decisions.
Chile’s inﬂation-targeting regime also included a focus on limiting ex-
change rate ﬂuctuations by having an exchange rate band with a crawling
peg that was (loosely) tied to lagged domestic inﬂation. This focus on the
exchange rate induced a serious policy mistake in 1998 because the central
bank was afraid it might lose credibility in the face of the ﬁnancial turmoil
if it allowed the exchange rate to depreciate after what had taken place in
ﬁnancial markets after the East Asian crisis and the Russian meltdown.
Thus, instead of easing monetary policy in the face of the negative terms-
of-trade shock, the central bank raised interest rates sharply and even nar-
rowed its exchange rate band. In hindsight, these decisions were a mistake:
the inﬂation target was undershot and the economy entered a recession for
the ﬁrst time in the 1990s.38 With this outcome, the central bank came un-
der strong criticism for the ﬁrst time since it had adopted its inﬂation-
targeting regime in 1990, which weakened support for the independence of
the central bank and its inﬂation-targeting regime. During 1999, the cen-
tral bank did reverse course, easing monetary policy by lowering interest
rates and allowing the peso to decline.
The contrast between the experience of New Zealand and Chile during
this period with that of Australia, another small open economy with an in-
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37. The terms-of-trade shock, however, was not the only negative shock the New Zealand
economy faced during that period. Its farm sector experienced a severe drought, which also
hurt the economy. Thus, a mistake in monetary policy was not the only source of the reces-
sion. Bad luck played a role too. See Drew and Orr (1999) and Brash (2000).
38. Because, given its location in Latin America, Chile’s central bank did have to worry
more about loss of credibility and also because Chile encountered a sudden stop of capital in-
ﬂows at the time, the ability of the Chilean central bank to pursue countercyclical policy was
more limited than that of the Australian central bank. However, although lowering interest
rates in 1998 may not have been as attractive an option, the sharp rise in the policy interest
rate in 1998 was clearly a policy mistake.ﬂation-targeting regime, is striking. Prior to adoption of their inﬂation-
targeting regime in 1994, the Reserve Bank of Australia had adopted a pol-
icy of allowing the exchange rate to ﬂuctuate without interference, partic-
ularly if the source of the exchange rate change was a real shock, like a
terms-of-trade shock. Thus, when faced with the devaluation in Thailand
in July 1997, the Reserve Bank recognized that it would face a substantial
negative terms-of-trade shock because of the large component of its for-
eign trade conducted with the Asian region and that it should not ﬁght the
depreciation of the Australian dollar that would inevitably result (McFar-
lane 1999; Stevens 1999). Thus, in contrast to New Zealand, it immediately
lowered the overnight cash rate by 50 basis points to 5 percent and kept it
near this level until the end of 1998, when it was lowered again by another
25 basis points.
Indeed, the adoption of the inﬂation-targeting regime probably helped
the Reserve Bank of Australia to be even more aggressive in its easing in re-
sponse to the East Asian crisis and helps explain why its response was so
rapid. The Reserve Bank was able to make clear that easing was exactly
what inﬂation targeting called for in order to prevent an undershooting of
the target, so that the easing was unlikely to have an adverse eﬀect on in-
ﬂation expectations. The outcome of the Reserve Bank’s policy actions was
extremely favorable. In contrast to New Zealand and Chile, real output
growth remained strong throughout this period. Furthermore, there were
no negative consequences for inﬂation despite the substantial depreciation
of the Australian dollar against the U.S. dollar by close to 20 percent: in-
ﬂation remained under control, actually falling during this period to end
up slightly under the target range of 2 to 3 percent.
While it would not be desirable if a central bank tried to actively manip-
ulate the exchange rate, this does not imply that it should not respond to
an exchange rate shock. However, whether it should respond and how it
should respond depend on the nature of the shock. As illustrated above,
the response to a real shock to the exchange rate such as a change in the
terms of trade should be entirely diﬀerent from the reaction to a portfolio
shock.
The relevant question concerning the transition economies is this: what
types of shock are they likely to face in the period ahead of the EU/EMU
membership? And how vulnerable are they to large exchange rate move-
ments? How much should they be concerned about exchange rate move-
ments for other reasons than the risk that the inﬂation target will not be
met?
Besides the standard shocks that all open emerging-market economies
could face, transition economies could face speciﬁc external shocks related
to the euro adoption: speciﬁcally, the convergence play. The convergence
play refers to capital inﬂows to accession countries stimulated by the ex-
pected behavior of interest rates and exchange rates ahead of the euro
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enced a sizable decline in the currency risk premium of their debt—that is,
the premium to compensate the debt holders for the risk that their currency
would lose value. The decline in the currency risk premium resulted in
lower interest rates on their debt instruments in local currency, and thus a
higher price of these instruments. Increased prices allowed holders of these
instruments to realize capital gains. Therefore, investors could reasonably
expect that transition countries that have joined the EU will soon adopt the
euro as well, and from past experience they could expect a reduction in in-
terest rates on debt instruments issued by these countries that would allow
them to reap capital gains. In other words, these investors have incentive to
play on the convergence of interest rates to euro area level and invest in
ﬁxed-income instruments issued by accession countries. The resulting in-
crease in capital inﬂows and currency appreciation could be viewed as a
pure portfolio shock that would require interest rate reduction. But reduc-
ing interest rates could conﬂict with the inﬂation target, because it could
stimulate domestic demand too much and result in faster increase in do-
mestic prices. On the other hand, if monetary policy does not respond, the
large capital inﬂow could lead to the standard problems of excessive cur-
rency appreciation, balance-of-payments problems, and reversal of capital
ﬂow resulting in currency depreciation and higher inﬂation.
Complicating the problem even more is the exposure of accession coun-
tries to a second shock—in this case a real shock. It has been well docu-
mented that as transition economies catch up with the more developed EU
countries, they experience rapid productivity growth, which produces real
exchange rate appreciation, either by means of nominal appreciation or by
means of higher inﬂation. In this case, the appreciation of the domestic
currency should be seen as an equilibrium phenomenon, which is sustain-
able and does not require a monetary policy response. In sum, in the period
ahead of the EU/EMU membership, accession countries could be exposed
to two simultaneous external shocks that would tend to produce exchange
rate appreciation but that would call for a diﬀerent policy response. In
practice, it could be diﬃcult to disentangle what part of the currency ap-
preciation is the result of the portfolio shock and what part results from the
real shock. Balance-of-payments data on the size and composition of cap-
ital ﬂows, and data on productivity growth, should provide some indica-
tion of the relative importance of these two types of shocks.
The recent experience of the Czech Republic illustrates yet another
problem: currency appreciation caused by a large inﬂow of foreign direct
investment (FDI) as a result of the sale of state-owned enterprises to for-
eign owners. One can argue that currency appreciation resulting from the
inﬂow of FDI is the typical real shock that does not call for a monetary pol-
icy response: the currency appreciates, but FDI inﬂow results in more in-
vestment, better management, and ultimately in higher productivity, which
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lems. First, while currency appreciation will always happen when there is a
sale of domestic assets to foreigners for foreign currency, it is less sure that
the increase in productivity validating the currency appreciation will fol-
low. For example, a large part of recent sales consisted of utilities where the
potential for increasing the competitiveness in export markets is limited.
Second, there is a time discrepancy between the timing of the currency ap-
preciation (immediate) and the productivity increase (later). And third, ex-
pectation of currency appreciation as a result of sales to foreigners of state-
owned assets could itself induce investors to take positions in the domestic
currency, in order to beneﬁt from the expected appreciation once the pri-
vatization payment materializes. This would produce a currency apprecia-
tion even before the privatization-related capital inﬂow materializes.
All this complicates signiﬁcantly the task of the inﬂation-targeting cen-
tral bank. To the extent that currency appreciation reﬂects an equilibrium
phenomenon, appreciation of the real equilibrium exchange rate, there
would be little reason for concern. Such appreciation would not threaten
economic growth and external equilibrium, and if inﬂation is still above the
long-term target, it should help the central bank to bring inﬂation down.
But how much should a central bank worry if this real appreciation is too
fast and too large? It could result in a widening current account deﬁcit and
subsequent large exchange rate depreciation, with negative eﬀects on in-
ﬂation. And it could cause problems in the corporate sector, because ad-
justment to a fast and large currency appreciation could be more diﬃcult.
The standard prescription for a central bank dealing with large capital in-
ﬂows and currency appreciation is sterilized intervention: buy foreign cur-
rency in the foreign exchange market and neutralize monetary eﬀects of
this intervention by selling bonds. Eventually, this intervention could be
complemented by interest rate cuts, to reduce the incentive for capital in-
ﬂows.
But this prescription may be of little help in the circumstances like those
in the Czech Republic in 2001–2002. Large capital inﬂows are mainly in the
form of FDI, and not attracted by a large interest rate diﬀerential. Reduc-
ing interest rates is not going to slow down FDI inﬂows. These are interest
rate insensitive. Sterilized intervention would be possible, but this policy
has its own problems. In order to be eﬀective, it would have to be of a very
large amount (on the order of several billion dollars) and it may not even
be eﬀective at all. Sterilizing such intervention could be quite costly for the
central bank.39
For these reasons, the CNB has pursued a pragmatic strategy of gradual
interest rate reduction, combined with occasional foreign exchange mar-
ket intervention of limited magnitude. This intervention has been subse-
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39. Of course, with falling interest rate diﬀerential, the costs of sterilization decline as well.quently sterilized. The CNB recognized that in 2001–2002 currency appre-
ciation reﬂected mainly the eﬀect of the FDI inﬂow, and that it was there-
fore a real shock that the monetary policy had no business of neutralizing.
However, the speed of the appreciation could be occasionally too fast, and
at that point, the CNB felt that it could slow down the pace of appreciation
by intervening, so that the corporate sector would have more time to adjust
to the trend appreciation. In late 2002, capital inﬂows related to the con-
vergence play (the portfolio shock) were not a serious issue for the Czech
Republic, partly because the convergence play and the compression of
yield spreads had already taken place.40 Otherwise, the situation would
have been even more complicated.
Another reason for not having benign neglect of the exchange rate is
emphasized in Mishkin (2000) and Mishkin and Savastano (2001). For
the reasons discussed earlier, transition countries with a lot of foreign-
denominated debt may not be able to aﬀord large depreciations of their
currencies, which can destroy balance sheets and trigger a ﬁnancial crisis.
Central banks in these countries may thus have to smooth “excessive” ex-
change rate ﬂuctuations, but not attempt to keep the exchange rate from
reaching its market-determined level over longer horizons. The stated ra-
tionale for exchange rate smoothing would be similar to that for interest
rate smoothing, which is practiced by most central banks, even those en-
gaged in inﬂation targeting: the policy is not aimed at resisting market-
determined movements in the exchange rate, but at mitigating potentially
destabilizing eﬀects of abrupt changes in exchange rates.
The challenges facing the central bank are somewhat diﬀerent in Hun-
gary. As was noted, Hungary still maintains an exchange rate band of  15
percent. In the literature on inﬂation targeting, it is often emphasized that
the absence of a second nominal anchor is one of the prerequisites of suc-
cessful inﬂation targeting. Pursuing two nominal objectives could result in
a situation where one objective will need to be given preference over the
second objective, but without clear guidance as to how such conﬂict would
be resolved, this could make monetary policy less transparent.41 The ques-
tion arises: to what extent might the existence of the  15 percent exchange
rate band in Hungary be considered as a second nominal anchor whose at-
tainment could eventually conﬂict with the inﬂation target? The answer has
turned out to be “a lot.”
In mid-February 2002, the exchange rate of the forint hovered some 12–
13 percent above parity, quickly approaching the upper part of the band.
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40. In fact, at the end of 2002, spreads on domestic-currency sovereign bonds compared to
the benchmark German bonds were negative for all maturities. See Ceska Sporitelna/Erste
bank (2002). Of course, the question is whether such dramatic compression of yield spreads
is sustainable.
41. On the experience with inﬂation targeting in the presence of nominal exchange rate
band in Israel, see Leiderman and Bufman (2000).Partly as a result of uncertainty related to parliamentary election, the cur-
rency weakened somewhat during the spring and summer, but it began to
appreciate again later in 2002. In January 2003, it approached the upper
end of the band, and speculation about the revaluation of parity resulted
in a sharp acceleration of capital inﬂow that forced the NBH to respond by
cutting interest rates by 2 percentage points and intervening heavily in the
foreign exchange market. The NBH is reported to have bought more than
5 billion euros, increasing international reserves by 50 percent and base
money by 70 percent.42 Even though the NBH subsequently began to ster-
ilize this huge injection of liquidity, market participants now assume that
maintaining the exchange rate band will have priority over the inﬂation tar-
get and expect inﬂation in 2003 to exceed the NBH inﬂation target.43
This conﬂict between the inﬂation target and exchange rate target need
not be a unique problem for Hungary. Other accession countries could face
this problem once they become members of the EU and once they decide
to join the ERM2 mechanism that requires them to limit exchange rate
ﬂuctuations in exactly the same way as Hungary already does today—that
is, to peg the currency against the euro and allow maximum  15 percent
ﬂuctuation around the established parity. Therefore, we now turn to the is-
sue of monetary policy implementation in the period after EU accession
and before EMU accession.
9.6 Monetary Policy within the ERM2 System
Participation in the ERM2 mechanism and subsequent adoption of the
euro are obligatory for all new EU members (no opt-out clause is avail-
able). But the new EU members do not have to join the ERM2 mechanism
immediately after the EU entry. Therefore, after joining the EU, the new
members will have to decide how quickly to join the ERM2 mechanism
and adopt the euro, and whether ERM2 membership would require a mod-
iﬁcation of the inﬂation-targeting framework.
How would monetary policy in the accession countries operate under
the ERM2 regime, and what would be the main nominal anchor of the
economy? Formally, the monetary policy framework after joining the
ERM2 mechanism will be similar to the monetary policy framework in
Hungary today, where the  15 percent ﬂuctuation band is already in place.
But there will also be important diﬀerences. First, the adoption of the euro
will be approaching, which could have important implications for capital
ﬂows (convergence play) and ﬁscal policy implementation (the need to
meet ﬁscal criteria). Second, breaching the target band (its lower side)
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42. See JPMorgan (2003).
43. Analysts have interpreted this as evidence that the NBH is determined to maintain the
currency band even at the cost of temporary higher inﬂation. See IMF (2002).would have diﬀerent consequences for Hungary today and for accession
countries operating within the ERM2 regime. Third, unlike Hungary’s
monetary policy today, the monetary policy and exchange rate of an ac-
cession country within the ERM2 regime will be of common interest to all
EMU members, and the European Central Bank (ECB) could intervene to
help the accession country to keep the exchange rate within the band.
The ERM2 ﬂuctuation band will allow rather large exchange rate move-
ments, too large to provide a suﬃciently ﬁrm nominal anchor. For this rea-
son, the inﬂation target will likely need to continue to play the role of nom-
inal anchor, as it did in Spain before its entry into EMU (see Bernanke
et al. 1999). Successful operation of inﬂation targeting after ERM2 entry
should be facilitated by the fact that the process of disinﬂation is likely to
be largely completed. Low inﬂation could reduce, though not fully elimi-
nate, the probability that the inﬂation target would conﬂict with the com-
mitment to maintaining the currency within the ERM2. Still, the possibil-
ity of a conﬂict between the inﬂation target and the ERM2 exchange rate
band cannot be fully excluded. But it is important to be clear about the na-
ture of this risk and how it could be mitigated.
Within the ERM2 framework, two situations could arise where mone-
tary and other policies may be constrained by the fact that the exchange
rate is approaching the lower or upper side of the band. One possibility is
that the exchange rate would approach the upper (appreciated) band, as
was happening in Hungary. In order to prevent breaching the permitted
ﬂuctuation band, interest rates may need to be reduced to moderate the
pressure on the currency. But lower interest rates could interfere with the
inﬂation target, because they could stimulate domestic demand more than
the central bank considers prudent and could produce higher inﬂationary
pressures. However, a strongly appreciating currency would also simulta-
neously act as a mechanism to dampen inﬂationary pressures, so it is not
at all obvious that this conﬂict with the inﬂation target would actually be-
come serious.44 If reducing interest rates would not help, and pressures on
the currency to appreciate persisted, another option would be to revalue
the central parity.45 This would reduce the burden of monetary policy and
at the same time introduce a one-time deﬂationary shock.
A diﬀerent conﬂict between the inﬂation target and exchange rate band
would arise if there was downward pressure on the currency and if the ex-
change rate threatened to break through the lower (more depreciated) end
of the band. Breaching the ERM2 lower target band would force the coun-
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44. The direct eﬀect of the appreciated exchange rate on inﬂation will be felt sooner than
the indirect eﬀect of reduced interest rates on aggregate demand and demand-induced accel-
eration of inﬂation.
45. For countries in the ERM2 framework, the ECB would also be expected to help a na-
tional central bank sustain the currency inside the ﬂuctuation band, of course, to the extent
that this does not interfere with the ECB’s price stability objective.try to start the ERM2 two-year test again, so it could be potentially costly.
Central banks could react to such a situation by tightening monetary pol-
icy and raising interest rates. But this response certainly should not conﬂict
with the inﬂation target. On the contrary, it should be in line with the in-
ﬂation-targeting policy if the reason for downward pressure was too re-
laxed a policy. And tighter monetary policy would also help to mitigate in-
ﬂationary pressures that may arise from currency depreciation. Tighter
monetary policy would also be appropriate in the case when the currency
depreciates as a result of a negative portfolio shock. Higher interest rates
should help arrest capital outﬂow by making domestic currency assets
more attractive. But the situation could be more complicated when the cur-
rency depreciates as a result of negative real shock which at the same time
reduced aggregate demand for domestic output (domestic or foreign de-
mand). Maintaining the currency within the ﬂuctuation band could re-
quire a tighter policy stance than what would be required if monetary pol-
icy were guided only by the inﬂation target. As a result, actual inﬂation
would become lower than the inﬂation target, and monetary policy would
further weaken demand and economic activity that was already aﬀected
adversely by the negative real shock. Under normal circumstances, this
would not be desirable. But temporary lower economic activity may be a
price worth paying in a situation where the alternative would be to violate
the Maastricht criterion of two years of successful operation within the
ERM2 system, thus delaying euro adoption.
To some extent, ﬁscal policy could be used to reconcile eventual conﬂict
between the inﬂation target and the ERM2 band. First, maintaining a ﬁs-
cal policy stance that would clearly indicate authorities’ determination to
meet Maastricht criteria of public debt and ﬁscal deﬁcit would reduce the
risk of downward pressure on the currency as a result of a negative portfo-
lio shock. It would also allow the maintenance of lower interest rates than
if ﬁscal policy were more expansionary, and thus reduce short-term capital
inﬂows. Second, a changing ﬁscal policy stance could be used as a defense
against large exchange rate movements threatening to breach the ERM2
band. Fiscal policy could be tightened even more than what is required by
Maastricht criteria in case of downward pressure on the currency that
would threaten to break the lower side of the band, or—to the extent that
meeting Maastricht criteria is not threatened—it could be relaxed in case
of upward pressure on the currency. But in this case, using interest rate pol-
icy would be clearly preferable as a ﬁrst line of defense.
The risk of conﬂict between the inﬂation target and exchange rate target
will depend importantly on market expectations of the conversion rate of
the national currency into the euro. If market participants expect that the
current market rate will be also the conversion rate, there will be less risk
of such conﬂict, as the behavior of market participants should actually
limit the ﬂuctuation of the actual exchange rate. However, widespread
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from the current exchange rate could result in large and volatile capital
ﬂows and swings in actual exchange rate that could severely complicate the
simultaneous achievement of the inﬂation target (suﬃciently low inﬂation
to meet the Maastricht criterion) and exchange rate target (keeping the
currency within the ﬂuctuation band).
How should inﬂation targets be set after the countries have joined the
EU and eventually the ERM2 mechanism? The obvious answer is to set the
inﬂation target in such way that it will converge to inﬂation rate estimated
to be consistent with the Maastricht criterion. Table 9.6 shows the annual
inﬂation rate in three current EU members with the lowest inﬂation rate in
the period 1995–2001. If we add to the average of inﬂation in three EU best
performers the 1.5 percentage point margin allowed by the Maastricht
Treaty, we receive the maximum permissible inﬂation in the accession
countries that would be applied if they were to adopt the euro in that par-
ticular year.
If we take the period 1995–2001 as a benchmark, the inﬂation rate that
the accession countries would have to reach in order to meet the Maas-
tricht criterion was in the range of 2.1 to 3.7 percent. In 1998 and 1999, in-
ﬂation in the EU countries was particularly low, and it would thus seem
that reaching the Maastricht objective would have been particularly chal-
lenging for accession countries at that time. However, we should note that
to some extent exceptionally low inﬂation in the EU was a part of global
tendency of falling inﬂation, which aﬀected the transition economies as
well. To the extent that inﬂation in the EU and in the transition economies
waiting to adopt the euro moves jointly in response to common external
shocks like falling commodity prices and weak global economic activity,
accompanied by large excess production capacity and weak pricing power
of producers, lower permissible inﬂation does not make it necessarily more
diﬃcult (i.e., it does not require a tighter monetary policy) to qualify for
euro adoption.
We can also see that the range of maximum permissible inﬂation of 2.1–
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Table 9.6 Lowest inﬂation rates in EU countries, 1995–2000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Country A 0.8 0.6 1.2 0.8 0.5 1.7 1.6
Country B 1.5 1.3 1.3 0.9 0.6 1.9 2.5
Country C 1.7 1.4 1.4 0.9 0.6 2.3 2.5
Average inﬂation 1.3 1.1 1.3 0.9 0.6 2.0 2.2
Maastrict criterion 
inﬂationa 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.4 2.1 3.5 3.7
Source: United Nations (2002).
aAverage inﬂation in three countries plus 1.5 percentage points. Average inﬂation rounded up.3.7 percent is broadly in line with the long-term inﬂation targets in the
Czech Republic (2–4 percent), Hungary (around 2 percent), and Poland
(less than 4 percent).
9.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed the experience with inﬂation targeting
in the three transition economies—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland. We have examined the circumstances leading to the switch from
exchange rate pegs to inﬂation targeting and the modalities of inﬂation tar-
geting in each of these countries. The short history of inﬂation targeting in
these three countries does not yet allow us to draw any deﬁnitive conclu-
sions about the success or failure of this regime. However, we conclude that
inﬂation targeting in transition economies could be implemented reason-
ably successfully. While the examined countries have often missed inﬂation
targets by a large margin, they nevertheless progressed well with disinﬂa-
tion. Still, increased uncertainty prevailing in transition economies makes
it particularly diﬃcult to predict inﬂation suﬃciently far ahead, as re-
quired by the forward-looking nature of the inﬂation-targeting approach.
In view of that, and given the possibility that transition countries will be
more frequently hit by shocks that could divert inﬂation from the targeted
path, misses of inﬂation targets are more likely there than in the more ad-
vanced economies.
This does not imply that monetary policy targeting other nominal vari-
ables like monetary aggregates would make the task of controlling inﬂation
easier. Even though inﬂation targeting in transition economies is more
diﬃcult than in advanced economies, it could still bring signiﬁcant bene-
ﬁts. It should be clear, though, that too much focus on hitting inﬂation tar-
gets at any price at all times could produce a signiﬁcant instability of mon-
etary policy instruments, damaging economic performance. The focus of
inﬂation-targeting central banks should be on the medium-term horizon to
ensure that disinﬂation remains on track and that inﬂation converges to a
level deemed consistent with price stability. Alongside this trajectory, there
will inevitably be misses, possibly sizable ones. Thus, the onus is on central
banks’ ability to clearly communicate to the public what the limits and pos-
sibilities of inﬂation targeting in transition economies are, and if it hap-
pens, to explain credibly and openly why inﬂation targets were missed.
A key lesson from the experience of the inﬂation-targeting transition
countries is that economic performance will improve and support for the
central bank will be higher if central banks emphasize avoiding under-
shoots of the inﬂation target as much as avoiding overshoots. Undershoots
of the inﬂation targets have resulted in serious economic downturns that
have eroded support for the central bank in both the Czech Republic and
Poland. Also, economic performance will be enhanced if inﬂation-
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nipulation of the exchange rate. This seems to be less of an issue in the
Czech Republic and Poland, but it is still a live issue in Hungary.
A diﬃcult problem for inﬂation targeting in transition countries is the
often stormy relationship between the central bank and the government.
This can be alleviated by having a direct government involvement in the
setting of the inﬂation target and a more active role of the central bank in
communicating with both the government and the public. In addition, hav-
ing technocrats rather than politicians appointed as the head of a central
bank may help in depersonalizing the conduct of monetary policy and in-
crease support for the independence of the central bank.
We have also addressed the future perspective of monetary policy in the
transition economies. We concluded that even after EU accession, inﬂa-
tion targeting can remain the main pillar of monetary strategy in the three
examined accession countries during the time before they adopt the euro.
Inﬂation targets would be guided toward meeting the Maastricht criterion
for inﬂation, which would require maintenance of inﬂation at the level de-
ﬁned in long-term inﬂation objectives.
In addition, an important advantage of the inﬂation-targeting regimes in
transition countries is that the central banks in the countries practicing in-
ﬂation targeting have been learning how to set monetary policy instru-
ments to hit their inﬂation goals. Since these central banks will have a role
in setting monetary policy instruments at the ECB when they adopt the
euro, the monetary policy experience that they have acquired by operating
an inﬂation-targeting regime will help them play a more active and positive
role in deliberations at the ECB.
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Comment Olivier Blanchard
The paper by Jonas and Mishkin does a very good job of describing the his-
tory, the implementation, and the eﬀects of inﬂation targeting in Central
Europe. The description is rich and informative, showing the inconsisten-
cies and the adjustments in monetary policy over time, the conﬂicts be-
tween monetary and ﬁscal policy, and the diﬃculty of achieving inﬂation
targets. The basic conclusion, which is presented with much honesty, is also
convincing: inﬂation targeting has not worked miracles. But it has led to a
decline in inﬂation, at an output cost that does not appear excessively high.
The paper, however, does less good a job of discussing the many issues
facing inﬂation targeters in those countries. It sometimes gives the impres-
sion that what remains to be worked out are details of implementation—
whether, for example, to have a point or a band for the inﬂation target, or
how to choose the time horizon for inﬂation targeting. I agree that these are
decisions that policymakers must make. But I also believe that there are
plenty of hard conceptual issues that have not been solved, and these also
need to be tackled, and tackled urgently. This will be the theme of my com-
ments.
Let me start with one remark, however. Many of the criticisms I raise be-
low apply to much of the research on inﬂation targeting. In this sense, sin-
gling out Jonas and Mishkin is unfair. At the same time, many of the unre-
solved issues are more obvious in countries that are going through large
structural changes, such as Central and Eastern European countries. For
that reason, it would have been reasonable to expect Jonas and Mishkin to
try to tackle some of them. This largely remains to be done.
A Theoretical Detour
At the center of inﬂation targeting is a proposition that I like to call a
“divine coincidence”: namely, that, under some reasonable conditions, sta-
bilizing inﬂation is equivalent to stabilizing output around its natural level.
To be more speciﬁc, let me work out a Fischer-type simple example that
will serve my needs. Suppose that price and wage setting are given by
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w   Ep   y   ew,
where p, w, and y are the log of the price level, the nominal wage, and the
level of real output, respectively.
The price is an increasing function of the wage, of the level of output,
and of a disturbance ep, which may reﬂect changes in the relative prices of
other inputs, in the markup, or in technology.
The wage is an increasing function of the expected price level, of the level
of output (equivalently a decreasing function of the level of unemploy-
ment), and of a disturbance ew, which may reﬂect shifts in bargaining
power, changes in unemployment beneﬁts, and so on.
Suppose that expectations of inﬂation by wage setters are adaptive and
given by
Ep   p( 1)    ( 1),
where   is the rate of inﬂation.
Deﬁne the natural level of output as the level of output that would pre-
vail if there were no nominal rigidities—if wdepended on prather than Ep.
Call it y∗. Then y∗ is given by




 (ep   ew).
Combining all four equations gives the following relation between inﬂation
and output:
   ( 1)   (    )(y   y∗)
The change in inﬂation depends on the output gap, the deviation of output
from the natural level.
The important point here is the lack of a disturbance term in the rela-
tion. In contrast to older speciﬁcations with “cost shocks” tacked on to the
relation, the relation between inﬂation and the output gap holds exactly.
The reason why: cost shocks are present, but their eﬀect works through the
natural level of output, and so through the output gap. Put another way, the
output gap is a suﬃcient statistic for the eﬀect of real activity on inﬂation.
The model I used to make the point is special in many ways, and so one
may wonder how general this proposition is. The lesson from much of the
recent research is that it is quite general (see, for example, Woodford 2003
for an exhaustive treatment and discussion). It holds in models with stag-
gered price setting and rational expectations: in those models, inﬂation de-
pends not on past inﬂation, as here, but on expected inﬂation and on the
output gap. But, as in the relation above, the relation holds without a dis-
turbance term.
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Stabilizing inﬂation—that is, achieving     (–1)       (if it can be
achieved)—also stabilizes the output gap: that is, it leads to a level of out-
put equal to the natural rate yt   yt ∗. This is what I referred to as the divine
coincidence earlier.
This result is, I believe, one of the main reasons for the wide support for
inﬂation targeting by macroeconomists. Those who care about inﬂation
volatility like the stated goal of the policy. Those who care about output
stabilization see inﬂation targeting as a commitment by the central bank to
stabilize output around its natural level, to get the economy out of reces-
sions, and to slow the economy down in booms.
The result, however, comes with three important caveats (and here I am
preparing the way for the return to Central Europe in the next section):
• “Natural” does not mean ﬁrst best, but the level of output that would
be achieved if we removed nominal rigidities but left all other distortions
in the economy.
It follows that, even if it could, the central bank may not want to achieve
a level of output equal to the natural level of output every period. Obvi-
ously, on average, it has to achieve a level of output equal to the average
natural level of output; if it tried to achieve a consistently higher level, then
we would be in Barro Gordon mode, inﬂation would increase, and the pol-
icymaker would fail. But it can aim to set output lower than the natural
level in some periods, and higher than the natural level of output in others.
Suppose, for example, that the sector most aﬀected by imperfections is
also the least cyclical. Then there will be less distortions in booms, more
distortions in troughs. It may then make sense to try to achieve a relatively
more contractionary policy in booms, a more expansionary one in troughs.
Or suppose that the shocks that aﬀect output also aﬀect the distance of
the natural rate of output from the ﬁrst best. To be more concrete, suppose
that increases in the price of oil are associated with increases in distortions
and thus a decline in the natural level of output relative to the ﬁrst best.
Then it may make sense to allow actual output to decline less than the nat-
ural level of output and thus to allow inﬂation to increase for some time.
(Whether increases in the price of oil are in fact associated with higher or
lower distortions is, however, far from clear; if as a ﬁrst approximation the
answer is that distortions are unaﬀected, then the answer is likely to be to
try to achieve a level of output close to the natural level; in other words,
keep inﬂation constant, even after an increase in the price of oil.)
A bit of algebra may help here. Assume, in the model developed above,
that the relation of the natural level of output to the ﬁrst-best level is given
by
y∗   y f   a    ,
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with mean 0, reﬂecting the eﬀect of changes in distortions on the natural
rate relative to the ﬁrst best.
Replacing in the inﬂation output-gap relation gives
    ( 1)   (    )(y   y f   a)   (    ) .
In this case, it is a reasonable guess that optimal monetary policy will be
to stabilize the distance of output from ﬁrst best: that is, y – y f   a. There-
fore, to the extent that the economy is aﬀected by changes in distortions, to
the extent that   varies, it will indeed face a trade-oﬀ between stabilizing
inﬂation and achieving its desired output target.
The important issue is then what lies behind   and how much it varies.
Note that  has only a vague relation to what is usually thought of as “cost-
push shocks” such as the price of oil. To return to the earlier discussion, a
change in the price of oil that does not aﬀect other distortions has no eﬀect
on  .
• The assumptions under which the relation between inﬂation and the
output gap hold exactly may not be satisﬁed. In that case, there will be a
disturbance term in the relation between inﬂation and the output gap.
For example, we know that, if there are both nominal wage and price
rigidities, then there is no single rate of inﬂation, be it price or wage inﬂa-
tion, that will do the job (see, for example, Erceg, Henderson, and Levin
2000). There may be a weighted average of price and wage inﬂation such
that the relation between inﬂation so deﬁned and the output gap holds ex-
actly. But if the relation is written as a relation between price inﬂation and
the output gap, there will be a disturbance term. And so, in that case, there
will be no way to stabilize both inﬂation and output.
• Achieving the natural level of output may not maximize welfare if it
comes at the cost of large distortions in the composition of output. This is
likely to be the case if shocks and monetary policy aﬀect diﬀerent parts of
the economy diﬀerently.
A parable will make the point. Suppose the West Coast and the East
Coast of the United States are separate economies, both with nominal
rigidities. Suppose an adverse shock aﬀects demand and output on the
West Coast. Suppose monetary policy only aﬀects demand and output on
the East Coast. Clearly it would be unwise in this case to try to achieve the
natural level of output for the United States as a whole. It would come at
the cost of large distortions in the composition of output between the east
and the west. In this case, monetary policy should clearly be aimed at what
it can actually aﬀect—namely, East Coast output. Or in terms of inﬂation
targeting, monetary policy should aim at stabilizing East Coast inﬂation,
not U.S. inﬂation (which, in this case, should be allowed to decline, because
nothing can and should be done to oﬀset the decrease in inﬂation on the
West Coast).
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with bank-dependent and non-bank-dependent ﬁrms, and so on. The les-
son extends straightforwardly. There is nothing that says that stabilizing
aggregate output is best if the eﬀects of monetary policy cannot exactly
oﬀset the eﬀects of shocks on the composition of output, or put another
way, when the cross-sectional eﬀects of the interest rate and the shock are
very diﬀerent.
Back to Transition Economies
Most of us are aware of the issues I just discussed. Anybody who tries to
derive optimal rules for monetary policy ﬁnds himself confronting them.
And, in the most thorough modern treatment of optimal monetary policy
to date, Michael Woodford’s (2003) book, these issues are discussed at
length.
But, when it comes to the policy debate, these issues are largely ignored.
Some researchers or policy advocates implicitly invoke the divine coinci-
dence, and argue that decreasing inﬂation volatility will lead to output-gap
stabilization. Others tack a disturbance term to the relation between inﬂa-
tion and the output gap, creating a trade-oﬀbetween inﬂation stabilization
and output stabilization. But the nature of the disturbance, and its relation
to the shocks aﬀecting the economy, is left unspeciﬁed. (Rather mislead-
ingly, this disturbance is often called a cost-push shock. As I have argued,
it may have little to do with what we usually think of as cost-push shocks:
for example, a bad harvest, or an increase in the price of oil).
Ignoring them, however, becomes harder—and almost surely more
wrong—when confronted with economies going through major structural
changes, such as transition countries:
•T hese economies started the transition with large distortions, and thus
a natural level of output very far from the ﬁrst-best level of output. Some
of these distortions are gone, some are going, and some are still there. Tran-
sition economies still have very much of a dual structure: An old state or
ex-state sector, composed of large ﬁrms, with serious ﬁnancing and gover-
nance problems and often a doubtful future: and a new private sector,
which is much more competitive, and is, in large part, the source of growth
and also the source of ﬂuctuations.
To the extent, however, that many of the shocks hitting these economies
are the result of policies aiming at removing some of these distortions (for
example, the liberalization of some prices, or the reduction of agricultural
subsidies), this suggests that the distance of the natural rate from the ﬁrst
best is probably changing over time. In other words, many shocks aﬀect
both actual output and the natural level of output, but they may not aﬀect
very much the ﬁrst-best level of output. In that environment, it is clearly
not best to stabilize the output gap, and by implication it is not necessarily
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practical questions addressed in the paper: How should inﬂation targeting
react to increases in prices due to the liberalization of public-sector prices?
Should it focus on an index of inﬂation that excludes them? Should it allow
inﬂation to increase for some time? To answer these questions convinc-
ingly, there is no other way than to take the theoretical detour.)
• The inﬂation process is intrinsically more complex than in richer, more
stable, economies. Price liberalization and changes in the evolving struc-
ture of labor relations and bargaining are likely to be the source of some of
the price and wage movements. Given that these economies are still young
market economies, price and wage setting and, by implication, nominal
rigidities are probably changing through time. Should central banks ignore
all these complications and just target inﬂation, or should they instead take
some of these developments into account?
• Given the segmentation of ﬁnancial markets and the fragility of many
ﬁnancial intermediaries, the eﬀects of monetary policy are likely to have
more asymmetric eﬀects on the economy than in richer, more stable,
economies. Sectors that rely more on bank credit will obviously be aﬀected
by monetary policy more than the others. Should the central bank ignore
these issues in setting its inﬂation target?
These are hard questions, and central banks had no choice but to pro-
ceed without knowing all the answers; but we, as researchers, should not
avoid them. To make the discussion more concrete, let me take one ex-
ample that strikes me as very relevant in the context of transition econ-
omies.
Which Inﬂation Rate to Target?
The paper discusses at some length the issue of what inﬂation rate the
central bank should target. It argues that the trade-oﬀ is between trans-
parency (for which the simpler the index, the better) and controllability (for
which the more controllable, the more the target is likely to be achieved, the
higher the credibility of the central bank is likely to be). These are indeed
relevant factors, but I think there are other and more important issues at
stake.
To see this, let me extend the model of price and wage setting I intro-
duced earlier. Assume that the price level and the nominal wage follow
p   (1   a)w   aEw    y   ep
w   (1   b)p   bEp    y   ew.
As before, p, w, and ystand for the log of the price level, the log of the wage,
and the log of real output, respectively. There are now potentially both
nominal price and wage rigidities. The price level depends on both the ac-
tual and the expected nominal wage, the level of activity, and a disturbance
418 Jiri Jonas and Frederic S. Mishkinterm ep. The wage depends on both the actual and the expected price level,
the level of activity, and a disturbance term ew.
If a is equal to zero, there are no nominal price rigidities; if b is equal to
zero, there are no nominal wage rigidities. If both are diﬀerent from zero,
both rigidities are present.
Let me assume adaptive expectations. Again, the reason is to make the
algebra more revealing, but nothing important depends on it.
Ew   w( 1)    w( 1)
Ep   p( 1)    p( 1)
Price setters expect wage inﬂation to be the same as last period. Wage set-
ters expect price inﬂation to be the same as last period.
Deﬁne the natural level of output as that level of output that would pre-
vail if there were no nominal rigidities:




 (ep   ew).
Then we can combine these relations to get
[a w   b p]   [a w( 1)   b p( 1)]   (    )(y   y∗).
This has four implications.
• If all the nominal rigidities are in wage setting (if a   0) and the cen-
tral bank wants to stabilize the output gap, it should target price inﬂation.
If instead all the nominal rigidities are in price setting (if b   0), then it
should target wage inﬂation.
If, as is likely, there are nominal rigidities in both price and wage setting,
then the central bank should target a combination of price and wage inﬂa-
tion, with weights a/(a   b) on wage inﬂation and b/(a   b) on price inﬂa-
tion. Targeting either just price inﬂation or just wage inﬂation may lead to
a very ineﬃcient policy.
The message is simple: which inﬂation rate to target depends very much
on the structural characteristics of the economy. Transparency and con-
trollability are relevant; they may not be as important as the considerations
we just discussed.
Lest you thought the issue was of limited empirical relevance, table 9C.1
should disabuse you. It gives the evolution of wage and price inﬂation in
the Czech Republic and Hungary for the years 1997–2002. In 1998, price
inﬂation in the Czech Republic was 10.6 percent, wage inﬂation 5 percent.
In 2000, price inﬂation was 1.1 percent, wage inﬂation 7.2 percent. In Hun-
gary, wage inﬂation in 1999 was 1.8 percent, price inﬂation 8.4 percent. In
such environments, which inﬂation rate is targeted is likely to make a large
diﬀerence to real outcomes.
• The second point follows from the ﬁrst. The right policy, namely here
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knowledge about the structural characteristics of the economy.
In the context of the model, it requires knowledge of the degree of nom-
inal rigidity in prices and in wages, as well as the way price and wage set-
ters form expectations. In general, it is clear that the design of inﬂation tar-
geting requires much more work on the nature of the inﬂation process. This
process may be quite diﬀerent in transition countries.
• If the central bank wants to achieve a level of output close to the nat-
ural level, then the equation above contains a strong message. Once the
right weighted average of inﬂation has been chosen, there is no reason to
make exceptions for agricultural prices, the adjustment of public-sector
prices, and so on. Maintaining stable inﬂation will lead output to move, but
this movement will reﬂect movements in the natural rate.
As the paper shows, this policy implication is at variance with practice
in most of the Central European countries (and many other countries as
well). Many countries exclude a number of prices from the inﬂation index
they target. It is also at variance with our beliefs (at least my beliefs): can it
really be that stabilizing inﬂation in the face of a major increase in the price
of oil, or a major depreciation, is really the best policy from the point of
view of output and welfare? This leads to the fourth and ﬁnal point.
• Maybe the reason we do not feel comfortable with this last conclusion
is that we do not believe that the ﬂuctuations in the natural rate itself are
optimal. If this is the case, then there is really no reason for the central
bank to want to achieve a level of output close to the natural rate all the
time. Maybe it should try to achieve a path of output smoother than the
underlying path of the natural rate.
And, indeed, many of the shocks that have aﬀected Central European
economies have come from changes in distortions, the kinds of shock that,
we saw earlier, may justify intentional deviations from the natural level of
output and thus deviations from the inﬂation target.
Does this provide a justiﬁcation for excluding some prices from the in-
dex targeted by the central bank? Simple exclusion may be too rough: the
logic of our argument is that changes in agricultural prices due to bad
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Table 9C.1 Wage and price inﬂation in the Czech Republic and Hungary
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Czech Republic
Wage inﬂation 7.9 5.0 5.0 7.2 8.1 6.7
Price inﬂation 8.0 10.6 3.0 1.1 5.3 2.6
Hungary
Wage inﬂation 19.5 12.3 1.8 21.6 14.8 13.7
Price inﬂation 18.5 12.6 8.4 9.7 9.0 8.4
Source: OECD Economic Outlook. Compensation per employee, and GDP deﬂator.weather should be treated diﬀerently from changes in agricultural prices
due to the removal of subsidies, not that agricultural prices should be
simply excluded.
I realize that, even in this example, the answers I have sketched do not
lend themselves to easy policy implementation. But the issues cannot be
avoided, and we should aim to understand them well enough to be able to
translate them into practical advice to central banks. We are not there yet.
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Discussion Summary
Commenting on Blanchard’s discussion, Gregory Mankiwpointed out that
the literature was distinguishing between productivity and cost-push
shocks, with only the former aﬀecting the welfare-optimal level of output.
Whether cost-push shocks posed a problem for central banks depended on
whether they stabilized output around the welfare-optimal level or the level
that would prevail absent nominal rigidities.
Ed Nelson pointed out that in transition economies undergoing many
structural changes, not enough was known about the eﬃcient level of out-
put to distinguish between eﬃcient and ineﬃcient output ﬂuctuations. In
this context, inﬂation targeting was a practical way of minimizing damage
from inﬂation to the economy.
Jose De Gregorio emphasized the importance of credibility problems in
transition economies and suggested that achieving credibility was more
important in the short run than other aspects of the implementation of an
inﬂation target. Moreover, because of structural change in these econ-
omies, producing inﬂation forecasts two years ahead was problematic,
and instead in practice central banks in these countries announced their
desired inﬂation rate for the next twelve months.
Jiri Jonas agreed with Blanchard about the importance of the eﬀects of
exchange rate ﬂuctuations on the composition of output. In the case of the
Czech Republic, large inﬂows of foreign direct investment in response to
the appreciation aﬀected companies and industries very diﬀerently, which
resulted in considerable pressure on the central bank to avoid further ap-
preciation.
Inﬂation Targeting in Transition Economies: Experience and Prospects 421In response to Blanchard’s comments, Frederic Mishkin emphasized
that the most pressing issue for monetary policy in transition economies
was to establish a good nominal anchor, which contributed substantially to
economic stability. He suggested that, while inﬂation forecasting was diﬃ-
cult in these economies, it was important for central banks to be prepared
to react to, and explain, deviations of inﬂation from their forecasts.
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